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SUMMARY 
Due to the significant limitations of static analysis and the dynamic nature of 
pointers in weakly typed programming languages like C and C++, the points-to sets 
obtained at compile time are quite conservative. Most static pointer analysis 
methods trade the precision for the analysis speed. The methods that perform the analysis 
in a reasonable amount of time are often context and/or flow insensitive. Other methods 
that are context, flow, and field sensitive have to perform the whole program 
inter-procedural analysis, and do not scale with respect to the program size. A large class 
of problems involving optimizations such as instruction prefetching, control and data 
speculation, redundant load/store instructions removal, instruction scheduling, and 
memory disambiguation suffer due to the imprecise and conservative points-to sets 
computed statically. One could possibly live without optimizations, but in domains 
involving memory security and safety, lack of the precise points-to sets can jeopardize 
the security and safety. In particular, the  lack of  dynamic points-to sets drastically 
reduce the ability to reason about a program’s memory access behavior, and thus illegal 
memory accesses can go unchecked leading to bugs as well as security holes. On the 
other hand, the points-to sets can be very useful for other domains such as the heap shape 
analysis and garbage collection.  The knowledge of precise points-to sets is therefore 
becoming very important, but has received little attention so far beyond a few studies, 
which have shown that the pointers exhibit very interesting behaviors during execution. 
How to track such behaviors dynamically and benefit from them is the topic covered by 
this research.  
In this work, we propose a technique to compute the precise points-to sets through 
dynamic pointer tracking. First, the compiler performs the pointer analysis to obtain the 
static points-to sets. Then, the compiler analyzes the program, and inserts the necessary 
instructions to refine the points-to sets. At runtime, the inserted instructions automatically 
xiv 
update the points-to sets. Dynamic pointer tracking in software can be expensive and can 
be a barrier to the practicality of such methods. Several optimizations including removal 
of redundant update, post-loop update, special pattern driven update removal, pointer 
initialization update removal, update propagation, invariant removal, and on demand 
update optimization are proposed. Our experimental results demonstrate that our 
mechanism is able to compute the points-to sets dynamically with tolerable overheads. 
Finally, the memory protection and garbage collection work are presented as the 
consumers of dynamic pointer tracking to illustrate its importance. In particular, it is 
shown how different memory properties can be easily tracked using the dynamic 
points-to sets opening newer possibilities.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 In this thesis, we develop a technique called dynamic pointer tracking to help 
memory protection, memory leak detection, garbage collection, path prediction, and 
program analysis at runtime. Instead of being a pure static approach or a pure dynamic 
approach, our solution refines the static pointer information dynamically through the 
compiler analysis. With the exact dynamic pointer information, a number of program 
optimizations and software protection techniques are enabled or enhanced. However, 
pointer tracking simply through a software mechanism can slow down the execution. In 
order to alleviate this run-time overhead, we develop several optimization mechanisms to 
achieve dynamic pointer tracking efficiently. Thus, our technique can improve both the 
static and dynamic program analysis with reasonable performance cost. 
1.1 Motivation 
Many programming languages in use today, such as C and C++, make extensive use 
of pointers. Pointers are used in C programs to realize the call by pointer semantics in 
function calls, to implement polymorphism in object-oriented programming languages 
via virtual function pointers, to implement complex data structures like list, tree, and 
array, and to efficiently share and access objects allocated dynamically on the heap 
through pointer assignments or dereference. The use of pointers is a powerful and 
convenient mechanism, but it also makes programs hard to understand, hard to reason 
about, and sometimes prevents an optimizing compiler from making code-improving 
transformations. 
 One of the key pointer attributes is the points-to information. A pointer’s points-to 
set enumerates a set of (abstract) memory locations where a pointer may potentially point 
to. Points-to sets are often computed statically and give an (over) approximation of a 
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program’s memory behavior. The use of points-to information is becoming more and 
more important, especially for those programming languages where a pointer could point 
anywhere. The points-to information is critical and is used for many reasons – to improve 
the performance of programs with heavy use of pointers, to make better branch prediction 
in architecture, to optimize instruction scheduling in parallelism exploration, to reduce 
memory access misses, to support multithreaded programs with the precise data 
dependence information, to assist speculative computation, to help reduce the program 
slice size in software debugging, to detect memory leaks, to assist garbage collection, and 
to achieve full software security.  
 In practice, pointer analysis presents a challenging problem for a compiler or a 
program analysis tool: it is hard to extract the precise points-to information statically. 
There has been an amount of research tackling pointer analysis [29][68][7][37]. 
However, several problems remain to be solved further. First, the analysis must promise 
accurate points-to sets. Static program analysis could not obtain the precise information 
due to the dynamic nature of pointers whose targets are frequently modified, and due to 
the allowed pointer arithmetic in programming languages like C and C++. Without the 
knowledge of dynamic pointer behavior, conservative assumptions about memory 
locations accessed through pointers must be made. These assumptions can adversely 
affect the analysis precision and the optimization effectiveness. One could possibly live 
without optimizations, but in domains involving memory security and safety, lack of the 
precise points-to sets can jeopardize the security as shown by Zhang et al.[1]. Thus, how 
to track pointers dynamically becomes an important problem that has to be addressed. 
Second, the analysis must be efficient and practical. Dynamic pointer tracking offers 
benefits in many different settings, but the huge overheads involved make it infeasible. 
Although a naïve dynamic pointer analysis could show significant slowdown, tremendous 
optimizations development and smart data structures design could improve the efficiency. 
On the other hand, driven by different customer requirements and different application 
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domains, some domain specific techniques based on the features could further speed up 
the tracking process. In this thesis, we explore the interesting research topic on how to 
realize dynamic pointer tracking with tolerable performance degradation. 
1.2 Traditional Pointer Analysis Approaches 
An attractive feature of the C programming language is that it allows the developer 
manage and control the memory use. This feature is critical for a lot of system level 
programming environment. It is one of the reasons why C is popular today. Pointer 
analysis involves a big literature. We discuss some interesting related work in this 
section. 
There is a lot of work [2][29][68][7][37] investigating static points-to set analysis. 
The analysis could be roughly classified into different categories according to that if it is 
context sensitive [29][31][74] or context insensitive[68], flow sensitive [17] or flow 
insensitive [7][11][37], and field sensitive [57] or field insensitive.  
Markus Mock et al. [48] provided an empirical study of pointers in C programs. 
They implemented two static pointer analysis algorithms proposed by Steengaard [68] 
and Das [24], and an extension of Steengaard’s work [64]. They compared the static and 
dynamic points-to sets. They measured the points-to set size at every executed 
dereference point in a program (a load instruction or a store instruction), and computed 
the average static points-to size. The average dynamic points-to size is obtained by 
considering the execution frequency of every dereference. Their experiments show that 
for a large number of programs, the static pointer analysis is so conservative that the 
points-to set size is several times bigger than the actual points-to set size at runtime. They 
observed that on average 98% of all dynamic points-to sets are singletons, but only 41% 
of the static points-to sets are singletons. So providing a technique to keep tack of the 
dynamic points-to sets like ours is critical in program understanding and optimization. 
4 
 Driven by the results of [48], Mock et al. [49] investigated the application of 
dynamic points-to data on improving the program slicing accuracy. They expected the 
dynamic program slice size to become much smaller. However, their experiments showed 
that the improved points-to information could not reduce the slice size significantly.  
 Later Zhang et al. [78] further studied the feasibility of using the dynamic pointer 
information to refine the program slices periodically. They discovered that in a given 
time period, the precise points-to sets could greatly improve the program slices. Their 
experiments demonstrate one successful application of the dynamic points-to data on 
program optimizations. 
 Rodric M. Rabbah et al. [59] shed light on the importance of the points-to data in 
speculative computation and program predication. Their work aims at obtaining the data 
and control flow dependence through compiler analysis. However, the statically unknown 
or imprecise points-to information could weaken their analysis strength. Orchestrated 
with our dynamic pointer tracking scheme, their speculation could be improved. 
Similarly, dynamic pointer tracking could assist data prefetching [5]. 
There is several type based pointer analysis. CQual [87] is a type-based tool 
checking C program properties. It is based on extra user defined type qualifiers 
annotations, and verifies the qualifiers along the program flow paths. CQual’s 
dependence on the user data hinders it from being a completely automatic tool. 
CCured [51] designs a type system reasoning about a program’s safety. It classifies 
pointers to three categories, safe pointer, sequence pointer and wild pointer based on the 
use of pointers. It does null checking on safe pointers, does bounds checking on sequence 
pointers, and does bounds and tag checking on wild pointers. There are two major 
differences between CCured and our work. CCured deploys bounds information around 
the pointer. It is not good for some work like garbage collection and memory security, 
which require the pointer target to be centralized. Second, CCured provides function calls 
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for bounds checking, but we provide the compiler generated assembly code, that is more 
efficient.  
Later BLAST [9] extends CCured by plugging in a model checker. It removes 
redundant runtime checks by examining if there is program safety property violation on 
all program paths. BLAST provides an error trace as the feedback to the developer. Their 
work is based on the assumption that a program safety violation must go through an out 
of bounds pointer dereference. BLAST improves CCured by reducing the runtime 
checking overhead. 
1.3 Our Approach 
State-of-art pointer analysis is either too slow or too imprecise for program 
optimizations in the real world. In this work, we propose a hybrid pointer analysis that 
tracks the pointers targets dynamically with static analysis, and design special data 
structures to perform the tracking precisely and efficiently. Our approach has the 
following advantages. 
Portability and Modularity: Our work is implemented at the higher level of the 
program representation. The pure dynamic pointer tracker is independent of the system. It 
could be applied to any platform and compiler. This is an advantage over other 
approaches that are specific to the hardware or compiler. 
Compatibility and Flexibility: The core approach is compatible with dynamically 
linked libraries and unmonitored files. The developer could choose to only track the 
interesting pointers. Our scheme could be applied to instrumented and uninstrumented 
files, as well as instrumented and uninstrumented statements. The program compatibility 
is supported at fine level. Our work preserves most of the flexibilities of the C language 
on the utility of pointers. The developer is not required to provide any additional 
information like quantifiers or annotations regarding the pointers. 
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Scalability and Efficiency: The space cost is scalable with the number of pointers 
created in a program. The runtime overhead is linear with the number of pointer 
assignment in the program. The dynamic pointer tracker implementation introduces a 
linear space and execution overhead.  
Our core approach works as follows. First, the compiler analyzes a program, and 
determines where to insert the necessary instructions for updating the points-to 
information. This is our baseline. Then, we propose several optimization techniques to 
reduce the overheads. Finally, we apply our dynamic pointer tracking technique on 
achieving memory protection and garbage collection. Our experimental results 
demonstrate that our mechanism is able to efficiently compute the precise points-to sets. 
1.4 Contribution Statement 
We provide a dynamic pointer tracking technique different from previous limited 
pointer analysis related work that is mostly static. Dynamic pointer tracking purely in 
software can be expensive; we propose several optimization techniques to make it 
tractable. We show how this analysis is essential (a must) for technique involving 
software security (memory protection); we also show how this powerful runtime analysis 
enables new optimizations (on-the-fly garbage collection). We have an ambitious goal to 
provide an algorithm to monitor the pointer behavior in an efficient way. We argue that 
the pure static pointer analysis cannot achieve precise points-to information, and a 
dynamic approach like ours is necessary. We further point out that purely runtime 
information based approaches lack of the ability of understanding the program semantics. 
In other words, a semantic gap exists. In this work, we take a novel approach to bridge 
the semantic gap through the compiler analysis and the runtime support. 
We propose a framework of applying dynamic pointer tracking on garbage 
collection. Based on the program semantics, we develop several garbage collection 
algorithms and illustrate the pointer behavior’s impact on garbage collection. Through the 
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static analysis of programs and the smartly inserted update instructions, the garbage 
objects could be detected precisely, immediately and aggressively using different 
techniques. 
We are the first to apply dynamic pointer tracking on memory protection. We 
develop an intrusion detection system through dynamic memory access control. Our 
scheme predicts the memory access pattern, and monitors the program execution at a very 
fine granularity. The major concern of the scheme is the performance degradation and the 
necessary data structures size. So we propose several optimizations based on memory 
access control to reduce the overheads. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
In this introduction, we introduce the problem of dynamic pointer tracking. We 
discuss why this problem is full of challenges, and is critical for program analysis and 
optimizations. We briefly discuss previous solutions to this problem, show their 
limitations, and talk about our approach at a high-level view. The rest of the thesis is 
organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 illustrates the possible applications of our dynamic pointer tracking 
technique, and further motivates the demand of the precise points-to information. 
Chapter 3 focuses on our basic dynamic pointer tracking algorithm design. We show 
our analysis model and the essential data structures for performing the necessary update. 
This section further discusses kinds of possible optimization schemes.  
Chapter 4 presents the role of dynamic pointer tracking in garbage collection. The 
first scheme aims at collecting garbage objects for C and C++ programming languages. It 
takes the impact of dynamic pointer tracking on garbage detection into considerations and 
makes better garbage collection based on the current context. 
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Chapter 5 elaborates on the second application of dynamic pointer tracking – 
memory protection. With the precise points-to sets, we could offer fine level memory 
protection  
Chapter 6 proposes a framework to identify the invariant predicate dynamically with 
the help of dynamic points-to information. 
Finally in chapter 7, we summarize the main contributions of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2  
DYNAMIC POITER TRACKING MOTIVATION EXAMPLES 
Pointer analysis involves a great amount of work. The technique could be 
customized and applied to different domains. In this section, we briefly discuss several 
examples to motivate the need for our dynamic pointer tracking technique. The possible 
consumers of the precise points-to information are program optimizations and memory 
security.  
2.1 Memory Protection 
Dynamic pointer tracking has a wide range of applications. In [1] Zhang et al. 
proposed a memory tampering detection algorithm that dynamically controls the access 
permissions for data objects. In their work, every object has an access permission bit. 
Their work involves the information regarding which object should be accessed by which 
store instruction. This information is gleaned through static program analysis, and the 
guards are inserted around the store instructions to check the permissions. For multiple 
aliased dynamic objects, such a scheme cannot offer full protection unless the precise 
points-to sets are available at runtime. In that work, the profile based analysis 
compromises the protection strength.  
 
Figure 1. Buffer overflow attack motivation example. 
Consider the buffer overflow attack example shown in Figure 1. If in the training 
runs the pointer ptr always points to the object O1, then the estimated points-to object of 
ptr is O1. Suppose that in the testing run, the else branch is taken; then ptr points to the 
if (…) 
ptr = &O1; 
else 
ptr = &O2; 
scanf(“%s”, ptr); 
Buffer overflow attack 
Input: aaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
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object O2. In this scenario, the store instructions in the scanf function are not be checked, 
since the current object pointed to by ptr is not as predicted. This problem can be tackled 
only by determining the dynamic points-to sets. Thus, dynamic pointer tracking is not 
optional, but a must to achieve full security. 
2.2 Program Parallelism 
 
Figure 2. Parallelism optimization motivation example. 
 
 
Pointer aliasing  Program slice 
(a) Aliased pointers and program slice through static analysis. 
 
Pointer aliasing  Program slice 1 Program slice 2 
(b) Aliased pointers and refined program slices after the statement S1. 
Figure 3. Program slices of Figure 2. 
Dynamic pointer tracking is very useful in improving the parallelism and reducing 
the program slice size. Figure 2 shows such an example. In this code segment, there are 
main(){ 
  p1 = malloc(); 
  p2 = malloc(); 
  if(…) 
    S1: p3 = p1; 
  else 
    S2: p3 = p2; 
  F1(p1); 
  F2(p2); 
  F3(p3);  
} 
F1() 
F2() 
F3() 
p3
p2p1
p3 p1 F1() 
F3() 
F2()
p2 
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three pointers, p1, p2, and p3. Through static pointer analysis, we observe that p3 could 
be aliased with both p1 and p2; thus the statements through the pointers p1, p2, and p3 in 
the functions F1, F2, and F3 belong to one program slice, and must be executed 
sequentially as shown in Figure 3 (a). However, at runtime, only one of the statements S1 
and S2 is executed. In other words, at a given time, p3 could only be aliased with one of 
p1 and p2. If the statement S1 is performed, then p3 is aliased with p1, and the static 
program slice is split in two parts as shown in Figure 3 (b). The two program slices could 
be executed simultaneously as two threads to achieve better parallelism. Thus, this 
example demonstrates that parallelism could benefit from dynamic pointer tracking.  
2.3 Path Prediction 
 
Figure 4. Path prediction motivation example. 
Figure 4 shows one example for path prediction using the points-to information. 
There are three variables involved in the predication, v1, v2, and p. Assume that the 
pointer p could point to anywhere. We could not predicate which path will be taken 
statically. At runtime, after the statements S1 and S2 are executed, the definitions of v1 
and v2 are available. However, without the information regarding where the pointer p is 
if(v1 && v2) 
T F 
S1: v1 = true 
S2: v2 = false 
S3: p = &v3 
… 
S4: *p = … 
F3() 
F2() F1() 
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pointing, we still could not predict the branch condition due to the unknown target of p. 
In other words, if we use the static estimated points-to set of p, both v1 and v2 could be 
pointed by p, so the memory modification statement at S4 is supposed to have a chance to 
modify v1 or v2. At runtime, after S3 is executed, we know that v1 and v2 will not be 
modified through a dereference store of p at S4. 
In path prediction, dynamic pointer tracking has two roles. First, if a pointer is 
directly involved in a branch condition, its points-to value could be used to evaluate the 
condition in a straightforward way. Second, even if a pointer is not directly used in a 
branch condition, the points-to information could remove the memory disambiguation, 
thus help the path prediction in another way. 
2.4 Dynamic Invariant Detection 
 
Figure 5. Dynamic invariant detection example. 
b=…  
 
exit node
a > b
*p > 10
a=… **q call F
true false 
true 
 
false 
P1 
 
P2 
 
P3 
 
P4 
 
true 
 
false 
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Figure 5 gives an example control flow graph to show the opportunities of dead code 
elimination for a loop. Statically it is impossible to do branch elimination for this 
example due to the unknown value of *p. However, dynamically if one knows that a > b 
evaluates to true and *p > 10 evaluates to false at first, and *q is not aliased with p, then 
the value of a, b and *p will not be re-evaluated again in the future. They become 
dynamic loop invariant. Therefore, the memory disambiguation is released with the 
dynamic pointer tracking, more variables become loop invariant.  
Both of the path predication and dynamic invariant detection could be applied to 
some framework like program migration in mobile computing. One important constitute 
of application mobility is to migrate a partially executed application. Such a mechanism 
is especially suited for applications on partially connected mobile computers, such as 
laptops and palmtops. The program code and file liveness are critical in the practice of 
application migration. The pure static program analysis is not good enough to speculate 
towards programs where the program state is small. With dynamic pointer monitoring, 
we could do a better path prediction as stated in section 2.3, which helps to improve the 
precision of program reachability analysis dynamically. For the example in Figure 4, if 
we know that only one branch will be taken and the function will not be called any more 
in the future, then the code on the untaken path could be discarded during migration. 
Also, the dynamic invariant detection with dynamic pointer tracking could help eliminate 
the dead code. Like the example in Figure 5, the program always takes the path P2. The 
other paths P1, P3 and P4 could be removed from the loop for the future iterations. This 
is under the assumption that the current function will not be called again. Otherwise, the 
branch condition a > b has to be evaluated again, and the paths P1, P3, and P4 are 
possible to be executed. The function call to F is not reachable under the current 
execution context. If there is no other function calls on F, F can be discarded too. Thus, 
dynamic pointer tracking could reduce the migration downtime by eliminating more dead 
code at runtime. 
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2.5 Garbage Collection 
Another application of dynamic pointer tracking is garbage collection for weakly 
typed languages like C and C++. If the exact points-to information is available at 
runtime, the garbage objects could be identified quickly, and the memory allocated for 
them could be reclaimed immediately.  
 
Figure 6. Garbage collection motivation example. 
Figure 6 illustrates how dynamic points-to information could help collect garbage 
objects. There are six objects (O1, O2, O3, O4, O5, and O6) connected in a linked list in 
the figure. The pointer p points to the head of the linked list. Suppose p is switched from 
the object O1 to the object O6. At runtime, if we know which pointer is pointing to which 
object, then O1 could be detected as a dead object. Next, the deadness of O1 results in the 
pointer to the object O2 being dead. The deadness information gets propagated along the 
linked list until the last object O6. The garbage detection process is triggered by the 
pointer assignment instruction. This is the first case how dynamic pointer tracking could 
help garbage collection. The advantage of our scheme over reference counting is that ours 
does garbage collection early at the point of pointer switch and not when garbage 
collection is turned on later. Currently, garbage collection is done selectively at certain 
points in the program and infrequently since it is so expensive but this can allow garbage 
collection to be done throughout the program and in an incremental way. On modern 
multicores this is good. The second case is that even if p remains pointed to O1, but 
O1 O2 O3
O6 O5
p 
O4
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become unreachable in the current execution context. In this case, reference counting 
style garbage collection does not work, but our frameworks will. The runtime 
unreachable code analysis is helpful in the garbage collection.  
2.6 Summary 
We observe that dynamic pointer tracking plays a key role in kinds of program 
analysis, system optimizations, and software security. However, to our knowledge, 
previous pointer analysis techniques could not provide precise points-to sets due to the 
limitations of static analysis and the lack of runtime support. In this work, we propose an 
efficient solution to track the pointer behavior dynamically. The implementation issues 
and optimization opportunities are detailed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3   
BASIC DYNAMIC POINTER TRACKING ALGORITHMS 
 
Figure 7. Static analysis framework overview. 
This chapter overviews our dynamic pointer tracking technique. Figure 7 shows the 
static analysis framework. First, we use the pointer analysis in [60] to get the static 
points-to sets. In this work, we target pointers whose points-to set has more than one 
object. In the following, we focus our discussion on those pointers. Then, the compiler 
classifies the pointer into different categories based on their declaration and use. Next, 
the compiler builds a pointer table indicating which variable a pointer points to. Finally, 
the compiler instruments the program with some special instructions in the source code to 
update the pointer table. The instrumented program is compiled with a C compiler. At 
runtime, the inserted instructions are executed when the program continues, and the 
Pointer 
classification 
Pointer table 
construction 
Instrumentation 
 
 
Static pointer 
analysis 
Compilation 
 
 
Instrumented 
program 
execution 
Original C 
program 
Library 
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pointer table contains the up to date information. In the following, we elaborate on the 
data structure design and the special instruction implementation. 
3.1 Data Structures 
Table 1. Example pointer table. 
 
A pointer table is a table using the pointer id as its key. A variable’s type 
information is used to identify pointers. Every pointer has a unique pointer id that is 
generated by the compiler; thus the table is collision free. One example pointer table is 
shown in Table 1. A pointer table entry contains four fields – the start address, the end 
address, the pointer address, and the referent-pointer. The start address and the end 
address fields represent the memory locations pointed by a pointer. The pointer address 
indicates where the pointer itself is in memory. The referent-pointer field informs which 
pointer is pointed by the current pointer. It is especially designed to solve the problem of 
pointer chasing that is explained in section 3.4.3. The first entry of the pointer table is 
reserved for the NULL pointer. Note that some of the fields like the referent-pointer, and 
the pointer address are not indispensable in all applications. In general, the data structure 
could be customized based on the application domain and the customer requirements. 
3.2 Special Issues on Data Structure Design 
There are several special issues in building the pointer table. There are a lot of 
subtleties in C; it is difficult to catch them all. We mainly focus on the problems observed 
from our empirical study on the benchmarks. We discuss those cases and propose the 
special handling methods for them in the following. 
Start addr End Addr Ptr Addr Ref Ptr 
0xbeffbef8 0xbeffbff8  p1 
0xbeffe000 0xbeffe060  null 
0xbeffe128 0xbeffe228  p2 
…    
ptr_id 
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3.2.1 Pointer on the Heap 
There is a big challenge in the pointer table design due to the pointers existing in the 
heap area. Statically, we cannot know how many such pointers there are since numerous 
pointers are created in loops, and the number of loop iterations is not predictable. For 
these pointers, we cannot generate the pointer ids for them at compile time. We call this 
kind of pointer as pointer on the heap.  
To solve the problem, a naïve way is to generate a pointer id dynamically after a 
new heap object is generated, and then creates a table entry for the pointer. However, 
there is a hard problem in this design. The compiler could generate a pointer id for a 
statically available pointer. For an assignment to such a pointer, the pointer table is 
directly accessed using the pointer id. However, for a dynamically generated pointer id, 
the compiler does not know where its entry is in the pointer table, thus it does not know 
how to insert the code to update the pointer’s target.  
 
Figure 8. Pointer on the heap example. 
Figure 8 gives one example illustrating this specific problem. In this example, there 
are three pointers defined in the function CreateObjs; they are curr, prev, and head. By 
struct Node { 
int data; 
Node * next; 
} Node; 
 
int CreateObjs(int n) { 
  Node * curr, * prev, * head; 
  assert(n >= 1); 
  prev = (Node *) malloc(sizeof(struct Node)); 
head = prev; 
  for(i = 1; i < n; i++){ 
  S1: curr = (Node *) malloc(sizeof(struct Node)); 
  S2: prev->next = curr; 
 prev = curr; 
} 
prev->next = NULL; 
  return head; 
} 
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analyzing the code, the compiler identifies three more pointers curr->next, prev->next, 
and head->next. Theoretically, we have six pointers in total. However, before the explicit 
creation of heap objects, the three pointers on the heap do not exist, so finally the 
compiler only generates three pointer ids for curr, prev, and head. At runtime, assume 
that an integer ten is passed as the parameter to CreateObjs. Ten objects are expected to 
be constructed, and every object has a pointer within it. Thus, we should have thirteen 
pointers in total (ten pointers on the heap plus curr, prev, and head). The interesting 
problems are caused by the statement S1, where the malloc function creates a new object, 
and the new heap object has a pointer within it. At the statement S2, the pointer is 
assigned a new value. Originally, the compiler inserts special instructions to update the 
pointer’s target. Without the information regarding the pointer’s corresponding entry in 
the pointer table, the compiler cannot proceed doing this. The conclusion from studying 
the example is that we have to generate the pointer ids for those pointers and map the 
table entries for them dynamically. 
 
Figure 9. Smart offset for pointer on the heap. 
The next question is how we use the dynamically generated pointer ids to update the 
pointer targets. The mapping between pointers and their entries in the pointer table poses 
challenges. One solution is to add one field in the pointer table recording the address of 
the pointer; then an assignment to a pointer on the heap triggers a search in the pointer 
Start Addr End Addr Ptr Addr Ref Ptr 
0xbeffbef8 0xbeffbff8  p1 
0xbeffe000 0xbeffe060  null 
0xbeffe128 0xbeffbe228  p2 
…    
ptr_id 
Data Pointer in heap Smart offset 
Data layout 
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table and extracts its entry. It is inefficient and could result in huge overheads. To solve 
the problem, we design a smart offset. A smart offset extends the normal pointer on the 
heap by adding an offset indicating its offset in the pointer table as shown in Figure 9. If 
there is an assignment to a pointer on the heap, then its smart offset is used to update its 
entry.  
3.2.2 Recursive Function 
 
Figure 10. Recursive function example in power. 
Recursive functions pose similar problems as pointers on the heap since all functions 
called recursively share the same pointer ids for their local pointers. This problem is 
solved in a similar way. First, the compiler builds the call graph and detects the cycle in 
the call graph. Then for those pointers in cyclic functions, the compiler inserts the code to 
create their pointer ids dynamically. One example is shown in Figure 10. At the entry of 
the recursive function build_lateral, an entry is created for the pointer l. At the function 
exit, l’s entry is erased from the pointer table. 
3.2.3 Explicit and Implicit Pointer Array 
typedef struct lateral { 
  … 
} *Lateral;  
 
Lateral build_lateral(int i, int num) { 
  register Lateral l; 
... 
  // create a pointer table entry for l 
  if (num == 0) return NULL; 
  l = (Lateral) ALLOC(0,sizeof(*l)); 
  S1: next = build_lateral(i,num-1); 
  … 
  // erase the pointer table entry of l 
  return l; 
} 
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A pointer array could be accessed through a variable subscript. Even if an array is 
statically declared, which pointer in it will be assigned or dereferenced is unknown. For 
this case, we use the index plus the array’s first pointer’s id to get the corresponding 
pointer table entry. 
 
Figure 11. Implicit pointer array example in mst. 
Although a pointer is declared as a pointer, it could be used as a pointer array. 
Figure 11 gives such an example  In this example, a pointer “array” is declared in the 
structure hash. In the function MakeHash, an index i is used to access the pointer 
hash->array at the statement S2. In our prototype, the pointer hash->array’s bounds are 
transferred to the pointer ent->next. According to the program’s semantics, the pointer 
ent->next’s access range is different from hash->array. Driven by this scenario, we 
determine to handle this based on the program semantics and the type system. If there 
typedef struct hash { 
  HashEntry *array; 
  int (*mapfunc)(unsigned int); 
  int size; 
} *Hash; 
 
typedef struct hash_entry { 
  unsigned int key; 
  void *entry; 
  struct hash_entry *next; 
} *HashEntry; 
 
Hash MakeHash(…) { 
  Hash retval; 
  int i; 
  … 
  retval = (Hash) localmalloc(sizeof(*retval));   
  //initialize smart offset array  
  S1: retval->array = (HashEntry *) localmalloc(size*sizeof(HashEntry)); 
  for (i=0; i<size; i++) 
  S2:  retval->array[i]=NULL;     
  retval->mapfunc = map; 
  retval->size = size; 
  S3: return retval; 
} 
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exists a subscript to access a pointer and the pointer is allocated using 
malloc(size*sizeof(type)) like function, where type is a pointer type, then the pointer is 
determined as a potential array. When the pointer is initialized at the statement S1, every 
pointer in the array has a smart offset allocated and initialized. Thus, in this case, the 
bounds information is well stored at a fine level. 
3.2.4 Pointer Parameter and Pointer Return 
Pointers passed as parameters have to be dealt with carefully. Some functions are 
not available at compile time. On the other hand, a function could be called by different 
callers, and different pointers are passed as the parameters. In those scenarios, the pointer 
id is not available for a pointer parameter. To solve the problem, the compiler modifies 
the function call interface, and transfers the pointer id together with the pointer parameter 
as shown in Figure 12. 
  
Figure 12. Pointer parameter example. 
A pointer used as the return value of a function has a similar problem as pointer 
parameters. Different pointer could be returned. How to tell the caller which pointer is 
returned is a problem. We push the return pointer id to the stack together with the return 
pointer. The function’s caller uses the pointer id on stack to get the return pointer’s 
information. Consider the example in Figure 11, the pointer retval’s pointer id is returned 
with it at the statement S3. A side effect of passing and returning the pointer id is to 
prevent the program from stack smashing [66], which replaces the return address field of 
void foo(int * ptr) { 
… 
} 
// pass the pointer id with the pointer parameter 
void foo(int * ptr, int ptr_id) { 
… 
} 
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an activation record with the address of a malicious code. Depending on the register 
pressure, the return pointer id can also be passed through registers. 
3.2.5 Pointer Type Casting 
How to handle type casting really depends on the application domain. For example, 
in the garbage collection work, to be conservative, we take the subtype’s bounds for both 
upcasting and downcasting. Also in the memory protection work, to avoid false alarm, 
both upcasting and downcasting take the bigger bounds.  
Most of the time, the type casting is to use a temporary variable to hold an 
intermediate result, and is finally the data is converted back to the original pointer type 
data. One example is shown in Figure 13. In this example, two pointers are cast to 
integers and assigned to f_left.value and f_right.value. Then the two integers are 
converted to the same pointer type (i.e. HANDLE *) data again, and assigned to two 
pointers h->left and h->right. The update code is originally inserted after every statement. 
For this case, the propagation optimization described in section 3.7.6 removes the update 
at S1 and S2 to get rid of the update for temporary variables. Thus, h->left and h->right 
are type consistent with the result returned from RandTree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Pointer type cast example in Bisort. 
HANDLE* RandTree(int n, int seed, int node, int level){ 
  future_cell_int f_left, f_right; 
  HANDLE *h; 
  … 
  if (n > 1){ 
      S1: f_left.value=(int) RandTree((n/2),seed,newnode,level+1); 
      S2: f_right.value=(int) RandTree((n/2),skiprand(seed,(n)+1),node,level+1); 
      S3: h->left = (HANDLE *) f_left.value; 
      S4: h->right = (HANDLE *) f_right.value; 
    } 
  … 
  return(h); 
} 
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There is no problem if a pointer is cast to an integer. However, casting an integer to a 
pointer causes problems. If the pointer is used as a temporary variable, only involved in 
arithmetic computation and there is no dereference of it, then it could be optimized by copy 
propagation as we show later. Otherwise, it incurs two issues. First, the integer’s pointer 
table entry is unknown. This can be handled with a smart offset. Second, the integer’s 
access range is unknown. There are several solutions for the second problem. We could use 
a fake pointer’s type and value to update its bounds, or the user could provide annotations 
indicating how big the integer pointer’s target is, or we skip updating the pointer’s target. 
3.2.6 Function Pointer 
One of the C language specific features is the use of function pointers. A function 
pointer bears type casting. Function pointers often bear type casting, and most of the time 
they do not have accurate types. Misuse of function pointers could lead to severe program 
bugs. If a program has an indirect function call, an attacker could tamper the function 
pointer with the address of the malicious code, and a subsequent call through that 
function pointer will transfer the control to the attacker.  
In this work, we take function pointers as a special kind of pointer. Every individual 
function is an object. The target of a function pointer is a function. Type casting on a 
function pointer does not enlarge its access range like downcasting on other pointers. An 
update for a function pointer assignment depends on the function that it points to. 
3.2.7 Unions 
Pointer in a union is a special issue. Figure 14 shows one example that has a pointer 
in a union. The integer type data i in the union a is assigned with a constant number at the 
statement S1. Then, the pointer type data p is dereferenced at the statement S2. Our 
scheme inserts the update instruction at S1. Some work like CCured does not support 
such a declaration. They require that the elements in a union type must agree on types, 
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say the elements must be all pointers or all non-pointer type data. To reduce the number 
of rules that would restrict the customers from writing code in the original C language, 
we decide to allow the user mix pointer type data with non-pointer type data in a union, 
as long as they agree on the data layout. In some applications like garbage collection, an 
object could be potentially pointed by the pointer in a union. To be conservative and to be 
safe, we assume that if a pointer is declared in a union, the assignment to any field in the 
union triggers pointer update. Thus, we will not collect a live object. 
 
Figure 14. Union example. 
3.3 Data Structure Management 
How to organize the table is interesting due to the dynamically created pointers on 
the heap and due to the recursive functions. The pointer table size could be increased and 
decreased at runtime. In the fowling, we discuss how the pointer table is managed. 
The first problem is caused by pointer on the heap. There are two types of updates 
for a pointer on the heap. When a pointer on the heap is created, an entry is constructed. 
When a pointer on the heap is freed, its entry is destroyed. To prevent the pointer table 
from fragmentation, we must remember which pointer table slots are allocated and which 
are freed. In other words, for a new entry allocation, the pointer table has to be scanned to 
find an available slot. It has been empirically observed that in many applications, the 
most recently created objects are also those most likely to quickly become dead (known 
as infant mortality or the generational hypothesis). So we could just record the last entry 
Union{ 
  int i; 
  int * p; 
} T; 
Foo(){ 
  T a; 
  S1: a.i = 0xabcdabcd; 
  S2: *(a.p) = … 
} 
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in the pointer table as last_entry. If the last entry is disabled; then last_entry is decreased 
by one. New entry creation request increases last_entry by one. This is a tradeoff between 
performance and space cost. In this work, the empirical study motivates us with 
scarifying the space for performance. Note this solution could leave some unused table 
entries, but it does not impact the correctness of dynamic pointer tracking. The table 
could be defragmented to get rid of the pointer table holes when necessary. 
 
Figure 15. Pointers on the heap and in recursive functions example in bisort. 
The second problem is caused by the pointers defined in recursive functions, which 
appear alternatively with pointers on the heap. One example function RandTree in the 
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HANDLE* RandTree(int n, int seed, int node, intlevel){ 
  HANDLE *h; 
  … 
  if (n > 1) { 
 … 
      S1: NewNode(h,next_val,node); 
 … 
      S2: h->left = RandTree((n/2),seed,newnode,level+1); 
      S3: h->right = RandTree((n/2),skiprand(seed,(n)+1),node,level+1); 
    } 
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olden benchmark [88] bisort program is shown in Figure 15 (a). In the function, a pointer 
h is defined in the recursive function. H is initialized at the statement S1, and two 
pointers on the heap are created, i.e. h->left, h->right. If the function RandTree is called, 
a new entry is created for the pointer h. When the statement S1 is executed, two entries 
are created for the pointers h->left ad h->right. Upon RandTree calling itself, the same 
process happens again. The pointer table looks like Figure 15 (b), where h1 means the 
pointer h in the first RandTree’s record, ad h2 means the pointer h in the second 
RandTree’s record. When a recursive function returns, its local pointers should be erased 
from the pointer table. In this case, the two entries in the pointer table for h1 ad h2 are 
erased. One could see that it leaves some holes in the pointer table that is not desired. 
In favor of recursive functions and heap objects, we decide to split the table in two 
parts. One is the static pointer table containing the pointers declared statically. The other 
one is the heap pointer table containing the pointers on the heap. The two example 
pointer tables are shown in Figure 15 (c) and (d). We use two last entry variables (i.e. 
slast_entry and hlast_entry) to manage the two tables. Dividing the pointer in two parts, 
we could remove the entries for the pointers in recursive functions easily without leaving 
the pointer table with fragments.  
The difference between our approach and fat pointer in the data structure design is 
that the points-to information is centralized in one data structure. Most of applications 
like the multimedia programs and the compressor/decompress do not deploy a lot of 
pointers on the heap. Only a few smart offsets are generated in those programs. Even if 
for some heap pointer intensive applications, the heap pointer entries could be garbage 
collected in a similar way as for other objects. The pointers in the static pointer table are 
treated as the root pointers, and the heap pointer table is scanned to find the live pointers. 
In this way, the pointer table entries of those dead pointers could be destroyed and the 
pointer table could be defragmented.  
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3.4 Update Instructions 
There are three types of positions where a pointer’s target is updated. They are at the 
function entry, when a heap object is allocated or de-allocated, and when a pointer is 
assigned through other pointer evaluation. Currently, the update instructions are proposed 
at the pure software level; they could be ameliorated with some hardware support or 
through specially designed instructions. We discuss the different update code for those 
three cases in the following. 
3.4.1 Function Entry and Exit 
 Statically, all fields in the pointer table are initialized to zero. At a function entry, 
the local pointers entries are cleared. We update the pointer table in a lazy way. At the 
function exit, the local pointers entries are not voided until the next time the same 
function is called, and its table entries get initialized. For a recursive function, new 
entries are created and destroyed at the function entry and exit, and last_entry gets 
updated.  
3.4.2 Malloc and Free 
There are two cases when a heap object is created through malloc-like function calls. 
If the newly generated heap object has no pointer in it, then the update instructions are 
simple. The start and end addresses are set according to the pointer’s type and its value. If 
pointers exist in the new object, then new entries are created in the heap pointer table for 
them. As discussed in section 3.3, for a free operation, if the pointer has the last entry in 
the pointer table, the last entry is updated. Otherwise, the table entry is cleared, and the 
table size is not changed. 
C developers sometimes rewrite the malloc and free functions to manage the 
memory pool by themselves. Consider the example in Figure 16. The developer allocates 
a big memory pool with a single call to malloc. An allocation for a new object calls 
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mymalloc1 which returns a part of mempool. According to the program semantics, the 
pointer dereference at the statement S3 violates the access rule. In our baseline, at the 
statement S1, the pointer p is enabled to access the whole mempool due to the pointer 
casting (described in section 3.2.5). The out of bounds dereference is not detected when 
the program is monitored. Our work is based on the semantics of malloc and free. User 
manipulated malloc and free like this is out of our control; it is managed at the developer 
level. Without knowing the program semantics, the parameters 100 and sizeof(int) mean 
nothing. Suppose we use the parameters to guess that p’s target should be within 400 
bytes, then the function call to mymalloc2 should also set the pointer q’s target with the 
parameters, but it is not supposed to do so. Therefore, take the typecasting in a 
conservative way like ours is necessary.  
 
Figure 16. User redefined malloc example. 
3.4.3 Pointer Assignments 
The compiler inserts update instructions right before every pointer assignment and 
de-allocation statement to keep the points-to sets up to date. The points-to sets are 
char *mempool = (char *)malloc(sizeof(POOL_SIZE) 
 
void *mymalloc1(int size){ 
  return (void *)mempool[index+size]; 
} 
 
void *mymalloc2(int size){ 
  int *x; 
  if(size < MIN_SIZE) 
return NULL; 
  else return x; 
} 
 
Foo(){ 
  S1: int *p = (int *)mymalloc1(100*sizeof(int)); 
  S2: int *q = (int *)mymalloc2(20*sizeof(int)); 
  S3: p[100] = 25; 
} 
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updated before a pointer assignment since some pointer is set to NULL. For example, the 
statement “p = p->next” makes p to NULL; p->next information is missing after the 
evaluation. The pointer assignment statements and the update code for them are shown in 
Table 2. We discuss them on a case by case basis.  
The first pointer assignment case is through pointer arithmetic. The address is 
computed based on the operands (e.g. p and r) addresses. The operation (e.g. op in “q = p 
op r”) could be add, subtract etc. How to deal with the out of bounds pointer computation 
has different options. A pointer goes out of bounds if its value is not between the start 
address and the end address. In the memory protection work, if an out of bounds pointer 
is not dereferenced, it will not harm the program. For example, an out of bounds pointer 
could become within bounds later through pointer arithmetic, and it could also be used to 
get the object pointed by other pointers. For these scenarios, going out of bounds does not 
indicate a program error. In the pure dynamic pointer tracking algorithm, we keep the out 
of bounds pointers. Some applications could decide to trigger an alert upon an out of 
bounds pointer dereference or upon an out of bounds pointer calculation. The second case 
is the statement like “q = &v”, where v is a normal variable, not a pointer. The address 
and the size of v are known after the assignment is executed. The target of q is filled 
using the information of v. The third case is the statement like “q = &p”, where p is a 
pointer. The target address of q is filled using p. In this case, the pointer q is directed to 
the pointer p; thus the ref_ptr of q is set to p. The forth case is the statement like “q = *p”, 
where the pointer p points to another pointer r as shown in Figure 17. After the statement 
“q = *p” is executed, q’s target is equal to r’s. P’s referent pointer field is used to get r’s 
table entry. The last case is through pointer dereference statement like “*q = p”, where 
the pointer q points to another pointer p. In this case, q’s referent pointer is updated to p. 
The last two rows in Table 2 are used to demonstrate how complex pointer chasing cases 
like “q = **p” and “**q = p” (both p and q are pointers) could be dealt with using the 
address and referent pointer information.  
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Figure 17. Pointer chasing example. 
 
Table 2. Updating code for pointer assignments. 
Pointer assignment Updating code 
q = p op r q->start_addr = p->start_addr    
q->end_addr = p->end_addr 
q = &v q->start_addr = v.addr  
q->end_addr = q->start_addr + sizeof(v) 
q = &p q->start_addr = p.addr 
q->end_addr = p.addr + sizeof(p) 
q = *p q->start_addr = p->ref_ptr->start_addr 
q->end_addr = p->ref_ptr->end_addr 
*q = p q->ref_ptr->start_addr = p->start_addr 
q->ref_ptr->end_addr = p->end_addr 
q->ref_ptr = p.id 
q = **p q->start_addr = p->ref_ptr->ref_ptr->start_addr 
q->end_addr = p->ref_ptr->ref_tr->end_addr 
**q = p q->ref_ptr->ref_ptr->start_addr = p->start_addr 
q->ref_ptr->ref_ptr->end_addr = p->end_addr 
q->ref_ptr->ref_ptr = p 
3.5 Limitations of the Work 
3.5.1 Compatibility with Legacy Code 
Program modules with dynamic pointer tracking must coexist with program modules 
without dynamic pointer tracking. Any realistic design for dynamic pointer tracking must 
allow libraries written without dynamic pointer tracking. A project using dynamic pointer 
p 
q 
r v
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tracking is very likely to use libraries written in another project, and it is insane to expect 
that all other libraries would be processed with dynamic pointer tracking or the library 
source code is available. Making pointers tracked in all code including existing libraries 
is not reasonable. Those libraries may not be transformed with dynamic pointer tracking, 
and there may be not necessary to use dynamic pointer tracking.  
The impact of coexistent problems is that there is no check and update on the 
untracked libraries and program components. If the returned pointer from such libraries 
or program components bears type casting, the points-to information is not accurate. If a 
pointer on the heap or in a recursive function is passed to an uninstrumented module, the 
metadata in it has to be stripped. In this work, if a pointer’s value comes from a pointer 
whose points-to information is unknown, its value and base type information is used to 
do the update. This is under the assumption that the use code does reliable type casting in 
those cases.  
3.5.2 Separation of Space 
A pointer table is declared as a global data. It could be stored in the reserved space. 
A program should not change the space and the smart offsets. If it did, say by overwriting 
the pointer table used to maintain the points-to information, the pointer tracking scheme 
might accidentally use the wrong data.  
3.5.3 Visibility of Pointers and Pointer Assignments 
All pointers should be visible at static time. The declaration of pointers could be 
used to identify pointers. In other words, a pointer’s offset in an object and its declared 
type are statically available.  
A dynamic pointer tracker has to know where the pointers are in a program, and also 
which kind the pointers are, so that it could determine which pointer should be put in 
which pointer table. For some hidden pointers, say, they are declared as integers, but they 
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are cast to pointers and dereferenced, the tracker is fooled into considering the variable as 
regular integer and does not create an entry for it.  
All pointer assignments must be visible to the dynamic pointer tracker. That is, if a 
pointer value is changed, it must be through a pointer assignment that having both the left 
hand value and the right hand value as the pointer type. Changing pointers through some 
obscure assignments like memcpy would conceal the assignment from the tracker, 
perhaps causing it to do the wrong update. 
For the purposes of maintaining the pointer table’s safety, consistency and integrity, 
we assume that all programs are written with a single thread. Multi-threaded programs 
could be supported by adding locks to the pointer tables. 
3.5.4 Setjmp/Longjmp 
If a program uses a setjmp/longjmp pair, the program’s call stack is broken. In this 
case, the developer has to take risks to use dynamic pointer tracking mechanism since the 
pointer table integrity may be not correct. 
3.6 User Support 
Dynamic pointer tracking is supposed to be applied to any C program. However, the 
program developer could also help the dynamic pointer tracking framework in different 
ways. In the following, we describe how programs could be written to improve dynamic 
pointer tracking. 
To improve the precision of dynamic pointer tracking. It will be helpful if the user 
could avoid type casting like from integer to pointer, or if the user could provide 
annotations at the type casting places indicating how to update the pointer's bounds. In 
this way, the pointer's target could be tracked more precisely due to the already known 
program semantics. In favor of dynamic pointer tracking, it is better to follow the C 
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idioms like not breaking the known semantics of malloc/free, not returning a pointer to a 
stack object. 
To help the pointer table management. The static pointer table grows due to the 
pointers defined in recursive functions. The heap pointer table size changes due to the 
pointers on the heap. If the user could transfer the recursive functions to non-recursive 
functions, and prefer using static pointers than pointers on the heap, then the static pointer 
table's size could be predicated in advance, and the heap pointer table's size could be 
better controlled. Reducing the number of pointers on the heap also helps garbage 
collection since it will reduce the number of memory scans for live pointers on the heap. 
If the user could follow the infant mortality rule, and destroy the most recently generated 
object first, the heap pointer table will have fewer fragments. 
To reduce the update overheads. Fewer pointers in recursive functions could 
eliminate the overhead to create and erase the pointer table entries. If a parameter pointer 
points to a small object, the user could pass it by reference. On the other hand, the user 
could choose a set of pointers to be tracked like the tainted data through the user input. 
The user could also select the places where pointer update is not necessary, and the 
bounds information could be collected using the pointer’s value and type. 
3.7 Possible Optimizations 
The goal of this work is to dynamically track the pointer targets, and provide the 
points-to information as efficiently as possible. Our basic scheme could keep full track of 
the pointers’ dynamic behavior. However, the large overheads hinder this technique from 
being practical. How to remove the redundant updates and to reduce the update time are 
the main concerns of this section. In the following, we first introduce some concepts, and 
then describe the optimization details. 
3.7.1 Pointer Definition and Use 
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Here are some terms, common to the pointer analysis literature and program 
analysis.  
Definition 1: A pointer definition statement is a statement that could modify a 
pointer’s value.  
Definition 2: A pointer dereference statement is a statement that uses a pointer 
target’s value. 
Definition 3: A pointer use statement is a statement that uses the pointer’s value.  
Definition 4: If a statement S defines a pointer and a statement T has a dereference 
of the pointer, then T is called S’s dereference statement. 
Definition 6: A pointer definition statement S (defining a pointer p) is reachable to 
its dereference statement T there exists a path from S to T if in the control flow graph, 
and there does not exist other pointer definitions of the same pointer between S and T. 
Table 3. Pointer definition, dereference, and use statements. 
Definition of q Dereference of q Use of q 
q = malloc() v = *q p = q op r 
free(q) v = **q  
q = p op r *q = v  
q = &v **q = v  
q = *p   
q = **p   
 
Table 3 shows the classification of the definition, dereference, and use statements 
for a given pointer q. The definition statements shown in the first column are pointer 
assignments in Table 2 excluding the two statements “*q = r” and “**q = r” since they 
are classified as dereference statements. The dereference statements are shown in the 
second column. A dereference could be at either the left side or the right side of a 
statement. In the dereference statement, “v” represents a normal variable or a pointer. The 
use statement set contains the pointer arithmetic statement. 
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3.7.2 Remove Redundant Pointer Chasing Update 
There are many positions where a pointer’s points-to set could be updated. Some 
updates need not be dynamically committed at the point where they occur, but can be 
postponed until the underlying dereference actually needs them – thus, an update could 
be lazily postponed until the point of use is actually reached. Since in the dynamic sense 
an update may not reach a dereference point, and may be superseded by another one, 
redundant and useless updates get factored out.  
 
Figure 18. Redundant update example. 
The redundant update removal algorithm removes redundant updates by identifying 
the necessary updates that are reachable to a pointer use or dereference, and thus other 
updates are removed from the baseline. The algorithm is not like the standard dead code 
elimination due to the pointer chasing cases. For example, in the code segment shown in 
Figure 18, the pointer p is dereferenced at the statement S3, and it is defined at the 
statement S1. The interesting issue is that the statement S2 assigns *p to r, and thus the 
nearest definition of **p is S2. The traditional definition and use analysis proceeds 
backwards along the control flow graph searching for p’s definitions, and thus it could 
not detect the nearest definition at S2. If a pointer definition exists between a pointer 
chasing definition and its dereference, it is possible to kill the pointer chasing definition. 
Whether or not the pointer chasing definition is killed depending on the dereference level 
and the pointer chasing level. We show the detailed algorithm in the following. 
The algorithm is shown in Figure 19. First, a pointer definition and its reachable 
dereference are identified. The function Identify_Ptr_Def_Deref_in_BB in Figure 19 (a) 
enrolls a pointer definition’s reachable pointer dereference in a given basic block to its 
dereference list. In the algorithm, the dereference is checked first since a statement could 
   S1:  p = &q 
   S2:  q = &r 
   S3:  x = **p 
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have both a pointer definition on the left side and a pointer dereference on the right side. 
If this is the case, and the definition is checked first, then the function returns without 
enrolling the reference to the dereference list. The function returns false if another 
statement kills the pointer definition; otherwise, it returns true. The function 
Identify_Ptr_Def_Deref in Figure 19 (b) collects a pointer definition’s reachable 
dereference in the control flow graph. It starts from a pointer definition statement, 
looking for its dereference in the same basic block, then it pushes its basic block’s 
predecessors on the stack to further search for its dereference. The search step terminates 
until it finds another definition along the control flow graph backwards. All dereferences 
of a pointer definition are stored in the dereference list. 
 
 (a) 
//input: BB – basic block 
//     S – pointer definition statement 
//     p – pointer 
 
Identify_Ptr_Def_Deref_in_BB (BB, S){ 
  if(S.get_BB() is BB) 
End_Statement = S; 
  else 
    End_Statement = BB.get_end_statement(); 
  for (T from End_Statement to BB.get_start_statement()){ 
if (T has a dereference of p) 
  S.deref_list.insert(T);   
if(T is a pointer definition statement of p) 
  return true; 
  }  
  return false; 
} 
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Figure 19. Algorithm to identify pointer definitions and their reachable dereferences. 
Whether or not a pointer chasing assignment is redundant depends on if there exists 
a dereference statement reachable from the pointer chasing assignment, whose 
dereference level is less than the pointer chasing level. A dereference level is how many 
levels a pointer is dereferenced, which could be got by calculating the * keyword. A 
chasing level means how many levels a pointer is chased by another, which could be got 
by calculating the & keyword appearing in the pointer definition and the pointer chasing 
definition statements. No matter where a reachable pointer dereference is (before or after 
the pointer assignment), the pointer chasing definition is not redundant since its 
(b) 
//input :CFG – control flow graph 
 
Identify_Ptr_Def_Deref(CFG){ 
  for (BB in CFG) 
for (S in BB){ 
  if (S is not a pointer assignment) 
       continue; 
  Cur_BB = S.get_BB(); 
  if (Identify_Ptr_Def_Deref_in_BB(Cur_BB, S, S.LHS) is true) 
       continue;      
  for(BBP in Cur_BB.get_pred_BBs()){ 
    Stack.push(BBP); 
    BBP.set_visited(); 
  } 
  while(!Stack.is_emptry()){ 
  Cur_BB = Stack.pop(); 
  if(Identify_Ptr_Def_Deref_in_BB(Cur_BB, S, S.LHS) is true) 
         continue;         
  for(BBP in Cur_BB.get_pred_BBs()){ 
if(BBP.is_visited()) 
  continue; 
      BBP.set_visited(); 
      Stack.push(BBP); 
    } // end for        
  } // end while   
} // end for 
  } // end for 
} 
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information is used by the dereference. The main algorithm for redundant update 
identification is shown in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. Algorithm to identify redundant pointer definition. 
3.7.3 Delay Update out of Loop 
The third technique targets loops. For example, Figure 21 shows a code segment 
from the twolf benchmark in the SPEC2000 benchmark set. The pointer assignment at the 
statement S1 is in a loop. There is only one definition of the pointer cellaptr in the loop. 
The pointer binptr[ablock][abin]->cell is never modified within the loop. Though the 
target of cellaptr is changed frequently within the loop, the object pointed by cellaptr is 
always live since it is pointed by other pointers like binptr[ablock][abin]. Thus, this 
observation inspires us with postponing the updating until the loop is finished. The 
original update code is postponed as shown in Figure 21. This optimization could be 
// input: ptr_chasing_assign_list – pointer chasing assignment list 
//      ptr_assign_list – pointer assignment list 
//      deref_list – a pointer’s reachable dereference statement list  
 
Redundant_Update_Remove(ptr_chasing_assign_list, ptr_assign_list,  
  deref_list, post_dom_tree){ 
  for (S in ptr_chasing_assign_list) 
for (T in ptr_assign_list){ 
  if ((S is not T) && (T post-dominates S) && (RHS of S is LHS of T)){ 
    find_deref = false; 
    for(D in S.deref_list())      
      if(deref_degree(D) < chasing_degree(S,T)){ 
        find_deref = true;   
        break; 
      } 
    if(!find_deref) 
      S.set_redundant(); 
  }//end if 
}//end for 
  }//end for 
} 
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applied to some framework like garbage collection, where an object’s live range is the 
key. 
 
Figure 21. Function uloop2 in Twolf. 
The conditions for this optimization on a loop are 
(1) The pointer is defined using one source in the loop. 
(2) The pointer definition source is not changed in the loop (including change 
through pointer chasing and dereference). 
(3) The pointer definition source is available out of the loop. 
(4) The pointer and the pointer definition source are not involved in a function call 
in the loop. 
(5) The loop does not have return or goto statement. 
The algorithm processes every pointer assignment in a loop. If the right hand side of 
the pointer assignment is not changed, then a candidate is identified. In other words, if the 
right side is not redefined, then the left side pointer’ target remains live; and the update 
could be delayed out of the loop. If the pointer is dead out of the loop, the update could 
uloop2(){ 
  while( attempts < attmax ) { 
    a = PICK_INT( 1 , numcells ) ; 
    acellptr = carray[a]  ; 
    if( acellptr->cclass == -1 ) { 
 continue ; 
    } 
    ablock   = acellptr->cblock ; 
    ablckptr = barray[ ablock ] ; 
    axcenter = acellptr->cxcenter ; 
    aorient = acellptr->corient ; 
    abin = SetBin( axcenter ) ; 
S1: cellaptr = binptr[ablock][abin]->cell ; 
for( i = 1 ; i <= *cellaptr ; i++ ) { 
 … 
} 
  } 
//update cellaptr’s target 
} 
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be removed. If inter-procedure analysis and function inlining are supported, the 
restriction (4) could be relieved. The candidate’s invariant information gets propagated. 
For example, there are two pointer assignment “p = q” and “q = r”. Although q is 
redefined, if r remains invariant, both p and q are both loop invariants. The other 
conditions make sure that the pointer’s target is still available and remains the same out 
of the loop. Finally, the algorithm terminates until it gets a transitive closure of the loop 
invariant pointer assignments. 
3.7.4 Delay Update for Special Patterns 
The second redundant update detection algorithm depends on the recognition of 
computation patterns. Through our experiments, we observe that a lot of pointers are used 
for the implementation of data structures like linked list, trees. To manipulate the nodes 
in such data structures, the linked list or trees are often visited.  
 
Figure 22. Linked list example 1 in Health. 
One example is shown in Figure 22. For this example, our basic dynamic pointer 
tracking scheme inserts the updates for both statements S1 and S2. S2 is used to traverse 
the linked list. After the loop, the pointer list is neither defined nor used. The object live 
ranges are not impacted by the pointer assignment at S2. Thus, removing the update code 
before S2 shows little influence on dynamic pointer tracking, but it shows significant 
struct Results get_results(struct Village *village, int village_ptr_id){ 
  struct List           *list; 
  struct Patient         *p; 
 
list = village->returned.forward; 
  while (list != NULL) { 
    //update p’s target 
    S1: p = list->patient; 
    … 
    //upate list’s target 
    S2: list = list->forward; 
  } 
} 
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savings in update overhead. The algorithm that delays update out of loop cannot be 
applied to this case since “list = list->forward” is a self definition that breaks the second 
rule. 
 
 (a)  
 
(b) 
Figure 23. Linked list example 2 in Health. 
 
void addList(struct List *list, struct Patient *patient) { 
  struct List *b; 
 
  if(list != NULL){ 
    if(list->forward != NULL){ 
     while (list->forward->forward != NULL) { 
        b = list; 
    list = list->forward;  
     } 
     //update b’s target 
 b = list->forward; 
     list = NULL 
    } 
else{ 
 //update b’s target 
 b = list; 
     list = NULL; 
    } 
  } 
  list = (struct List *)malloc(sizeof(struct List)); 
}  
void addList(struct List *list, struct Patient *patient) { 
  struct List *b; 
 
  while (list != NULL) { 
    S1: b = list; 
S2: list = list->forward;  
}   
  list = (struct List *)malloc(sizeof(struct List));   
} 
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The difficulty for this solution is that simply deleting the update loses some of the 
points-to information. For example, in Figure 23, the pointer b’s target comes from the 
pointer list’s information. If we remove the update for the statement S2, then the update 
for b at the statement S1 is not correct. To solve the problem, we transform the while 
loop as shown in Figure 23 (b). The last iteration of the loop is peeled off so that the 
update could be inserted out of the loop. On the other hand, if the pointer list is used 
outside of the loop, the loop also has to be transformed in the similar way. Currently, we 
only consider one layer peeling. In other words, if there is another statement using b’s 
value, we choose not to optimize the update code. Another observation is that most of the 
code following the pattern bears no type casting. It allows us to use the pointer’s type and 
value to update its target after the loop, and loop peeling is not necessary. 
The algorithm is shown in Figure 24. The major things to consider in the pattern 
recognition are the availability of the pointer’s target information and the liveness of the 
pointer’s target. It restricts the other pointer definitions not to impact the whole list of 
objects liveness and makes sure that the pointer’s target can be seen out side of the loop. 
First, the loops matching the pattern are identified and the potential pointer assignments 
are collected in the pointer assignment list. Then, the pointer assignment list is processed 
to determine if the following conditions are satisfied.  
(1) The loop condition is testing if a pointer p or a pointer field of a pointer p is 
NULL.  
(2) In the loop, the pointer p is defined through a statement like p = p->field. 
(3) In the loop, the pointer p is only defined once. 
(4) The other pointer assignments in the loop must use p as the right hand side. 
(5) There is no return or goto statement in the loop. 
(6) P is not involved in a function call in the loop. 
(7) If p is used to define another pointer q, and q is live out of the loop, then the 
loop is peeled. 
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Figure 24. Algorithm to delay update for special patterns. 
 
3.7.5 Remove Update for Pointer Initialization 
The update code for initializing a pointer on the heap to null is redundant. This owes 
to our pointer table design. Initially, all fields in the pointer table are zero. If the last entry 
//input: ptr_assign_list – pointer assignment list 
//     loop information 
 
Delay_Update_for_Special_Pattern{ 
  for(S in ptr_assign_list){ 
    p = S.LHS; 
if((L = S->get_loop()) is NULL) || !match_entry_pattern(L->get_entry() 
  || (L has return or goto statement) || !match_inner_patttern(S) 
      || (L has function call with s as a parameter) 
      || ((L has other pointer assignment T) && (T.RHS is not p) 
      || (L has more than one definition of p)) 
      continue; 
condition_satisfied = false; 
for(T in L){ 
  if(RHS of T is p) 
    use_list.insert(T);       
} 
if(!use_list.is_empty()){ 
  condition_satisfied = true; 
  for(T in L){ 
    for(U in use_list){  
      if(RHS of U is LHS of T){ 
        condition_satisfied = false; 
        break; 
      } 
    }//end for 
    If(!condition_satisfied) 
      break; 
  }//end for 
  if(condtion_satisfied){ 
    peel_loop(L);     
  } 
}//end if 
else 
  S.set_update_delay(); 
  }end for 
} 
45 
of the pointer table is deactivated, its fields are set zero. For example, a pointer is freed; 
then its corresponding entry in the pointer table is erased. Thus, it is not unnecessary to 
initialize the entry as done in the baseline. One example is shown in Figure 25. In the 
example, when a new heap object is created, its four pointer fields are initialized to 
NULL. The function is frequently called by the benchmark program. Updating the 
pointer target on the if branch is not necessary. The algorithm to remove the update for 
initializing a pointer on the heap to null is shown in Figure 26. The condition for this type 
of optimization on a loop is There is no other pointer assignment that redefines the 
pointer between the function entry and the pointer assignments. 
 
Figure 25. NULL initialization example in Perimeter. 
QuadTree MakeTree(int size, int center_x, int center_y, int lo_proc, 
    int hi_proc, QuadTree parent, ChildType ct, int level) { 
  int intersect=0; 
  QuadTree retval; 
  retval = (QuadTree) malloc(sizeof(*retval)); 
  retval->parent = parent; 
  retval->childtype = ct; 
 
  intersect = CheckIntersect(center_x,center_y,size); 
  size = size/2; 
  if ((intersect==0) && (size<512)){ 
      retval->color = white; 
      retval->nw = NULL; 
      retval->ne = NULL; 
      retval->sw = NULL; 
      retval->se = NULL; 
    } 
  … 
  return retval; 
} 
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Figure 26. Algorithm to remove update for pointer initialization. 
3.7.6 Propagate Update 
Through the study of the applications, we find that a lot of pointers are used to store 
the intermediate result that is used soon by later pointer assignments. The update for the 
intermediate pointers is only used to transfer the points-to information. It neither bears 
dereference, nor impact the object live range, thus could be removed. 
Figure 27 shows such an example. In this example, the two local pointers left and 
right are defined at the statements S1 and S3. Then they are used at the statement S2 ad 
S4. They do not have other definitions or uses anywhere else. Our baseline inserts the 
update code for the pointers left and right immediately after the statements S1 and S3 as 
shown on Figure 27 (a). The optimized update code is shown in Figure 27 (b), where the 
updates for the pointer left and right are removed. In this way, four update statements 
could be removed. Also, the compiler does not need to create entries for the two pointers 
left and right, and the entry initialization code for them could be eliminated. 
 
//input: ptr_assign_list – pointer assignment list 
 
Remove_Update_for_Pointer_Initialization{ 
  for(every null pointer assignment S in ptr_assign_list){ 
find_prev_def = false; 
for(T in ptr_assign_list){ 
  if((T is not S) && (reachable(S, T, CFG)){ 
    find_prev_def = true; 
    break; 
  } 
} 
if(!find_prev_def) 
  S.set_redundant_null_initialization(); 
  } 
} 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 27. Treeadd example. 
The conditions for this type of optimization are 
(1) The definition p = q dominates its use. 
(2) The use only has one definition, that is p = q.  
(3) P is not dereferenced or used after the use. 
struct tree *TreeAlloc (int level, int lo, int proc){ 
struct tree * new, * right, * left; 
 
if(level == 0) 
 return NULL; 
new = (struct tree *) malloc(sizeof(struct tree)); 
new->val = 1; 
S1: left = TreeAlloc(level-1, lo+proc/2, proc/2); 
//update left’s target 
S2: new->left = left; 
//update new->left’s target 
S3: right = TreeAlloc(level-1, lo, proc/2); 
//update right’s target 
S4: new->right = right; 
//update new->right’s target 
return new; 
} 
struct tree *TreeAlloc (int level, int lo, int proc){ 
struct tree * new, * right, * left; 
 
if(level == 0) 
 return NULL; 
 
S1: left = TreeAlloc(level-1, lo+proc/2, proc/2); 
S2: new->left = left; 
//update new->left’s targete 
S3: right = TreeAlloc(level-1, lo, proc/2); 
S4: new->right = right;  
//update new->right’s target 
return new; 
} 
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The algorithm to propagate update is shown in Figure 28. The algorithm searches 
the pointer assignment list for a pointer use and its dominator definition. If the pointer use 
has no other definitions, then the update is delayed to the use point. If the pointer’s all 
updates get propagated to its use sites, then the compiler does not generate a pointer id 
for it.  
 
Figure 28. Algorithm to propagate update. 
3.7.7 Invariant Removal 
Multimedia applications tend to use pointers to access big buffers. Those pointers 
are initialized once, and then used to visit the buffer data within a loop with auto 
increment. In such cases, the pointer’s target is not changed in the loop. One example is 
shown in Figure 29. The pointer update pattern is simple arithmetic calculation like plus 
plus. The updates for those pointers in the loop do not change the information in the 
pointer table. Removing those updates does not harm the correctness and integrity of the 
pointer table, and could reduce the overhead significantly. 
//input: ptr_assign_list – pointer assignment list 
 
Propagate_Update{ 
  for(S in ptr_assign_list){ 
for(S’s use T) 
  if((reachable(S, T, dom_tree)) && (T’s definition set size is 1) 
      && ! ((T’ is S’s) && (T’ is reachable from T))) 
    S.set_propagation(T); 
if(all updates for S are propagated) 
  ptr_assign_list.remove(S); 
  }//end for 
} 
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Figure 29. Adpcm_coder example. 
 
Figure 30. Gzip example. 
 
Another example is shown in Figure 30. In the SPEC2000 gzip program, the 
longestmatch function is called 1.5 million times, and consumes 70% of the total 
execution time. In that function, two pointer scan and match are self increased in a do 
loop; both of the pointers targets are not changed within the loop. There are sixteen 
dereference stores per iteration. If we do not support the dynamic points-to sets, those 
dereferences will go unchecked, causing big security loss. On the other hand, if dynamic 
pointer tracking is deployed, the overhead for updating the pointer target is out of the 
loop, which incurs little slowdown. Tradeoff a little overhead for a big security gain 
motivates us to develop a dynamic pointer tracker. 
3.7.8 On Demand Dynamic Pointer Tracking 
In this section, we only propose some general purpose optimization techniques. 
Actually, a lot of domain driven approaches could be proposed to achieve efficient 
adpcm_coder(indata, outdata, len, state){ 
  outp = (signed char *)outdata; 
  inp = indata; 
  for ( ; len > 0 ; len-- ) { 
    S1: val = *inp++; 
… 
S2: *outp++ = (delta & 0x0f) | outputbuffer; 
  } 
} 
int longest_match(cur_match) 
IPos cur_match;  
{ 
  do { 
  } while (*++scan == *++match && *++scan == *++match && 
   *++scan == *++match && *++scan == *++match && 
   *++scan == *++match && *++scan == *++match && 
   *++scan == *++match && *++scan == *++match && 
   scan < strend); 
} 
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dynamic pointer tracking. In some applications, not all pointers are sensitive. Thus, only 
those sensitive pointers need to be tracked. A sensitive pointer’s value could come from a 
non-sensitive pointer’s value. In this case, the sensitive pointer’s value and its base type 
are used to do the update. The advantage of this on demand dynamic pointer tracking is 
the low overhead. The drawback is that sometimes not all points-to information is 
available. However, in some domains, tracking some of the pointers is more attractive 
due to the low cost and the special analysis requirement.   
3.8 Dynamic Pointer Tracking Experimental Results 
Table 4. The description of olden benchmark. 
Benchmark Description Data Organization 
Bh Barnes & Hut N-body force computation 
algorithm 
Heterogenous OcTree 
Bisort Forward & backward sort of integers using 
2 disjoint bitonic sequences which are 
merged to get sorted result 
Binary-tree 
Em3d Electromagnetic wave propagation in a 3D 
object 
Single-linked lists 
Health Columbian health care simulation Double-linked lists 
Mst Minimum spanning tree of a graph Array of single-linked lists 
Perimeter Perimeters of regions in images Quad-tree 
Power Power pricing system optimization problem 
solver, leaves are clients asking power and 
root is power plant returning pricing  
N-way tree, single-linked 
lists 
Treeadd Recursive sum of values in balance B-tree Binary-tree 
Tsp Traveling salesman problem solver using a 
particular algorithm and a closet point 
heuristic 
Balance binary-tree 
Voronoi Computes the voronoi diagram of a set of 
points recursively on the tree 
Balanced binary-tree 
 
In this section, we show our experimental results and discuss our observations. We 
target x86 architecture that is widely deployed on personal PC and some servers in 
today’s world. Currently we focus on programs written in the C programming language. 
The compiler we use is MACH-SUIF [81] that provides friendly user interface for the 
compiler development. The C code is converted to MACH-SUIF representation and our 
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work is implemented based on the MACH-SUIF code. The benchmarks are the olden 
benchmarks that make intensive use of pointers. The benchmark description is in Table 4. 
The benchmarks are instrumented to gather the dynamic pointer assignment accounts. In 
the following, we show the analysis results to demonstrate the opportunities for 
optimizing the baseline.  
3.8.1 Static Pointer Analysis 
First, we show the static pointer analysis results. The pointers are divided in two 
groups – local pointer, and global pointer. The classification is determined by where a 
pointer is declared. The scope of local pointers is a function; the scope of global pointers 
is either a file or a program. In other words, global pointers are defined either as static or 
as global. 
Table 5. Number of local and global pointers. 
Benchmark Glocal pointer Local pointer 
Bh 3 349 
Bisort 0 29 
em3d 0 53 
Health 0 54 
Mst 2 70 
perimeter 0 18 
Power 0 25 
Treeadd 0 9 
Tsp 0 45 
Union 0 25 
Voronoi 8 143 
 
Table 5 reports the number of pointers. The average numbers of global pointers and 
local pointers are 1 and 68. From this table, we observe that the number of local pointers 
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is much bigger than the number of global pointers. Most of the local pointers are used to 
visit some complex structures and store the intermediate value. Thus, focusing on the 
local pointers for optimization is most beneficial. 
Figure 31 shows the number of pointer assignments. Figure 31 (a) gives the pointers 
defined on the left hand side. The three columns represent the global pointers, local 
pointers, pointers on the heap and others, where others mean unknown type of pointers 
like parameter pointers. We could observe that most of the pointer assignments are 
assigned to local pointers. Figure 31 (b) shows the pointers that are used on the right hand 
side. Besides the three similar columns in Figure (a), Figure (b) has the function call, null 
and type casting columns that indicate the pointer’s value coming from a function call, a 
null initialization, and some value through type conversion like pointer assignments 
through malloc functions. The right hand pointers type is diversified. Pointers on the heap 
and local pointers are the major things, the others like null and function call are also 
important. 
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(a) Defined on the left hand side 
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(b) Used on the right hand side 
Figure 31. Static pointer assignment. 
3.8.2 Dynamic Pointer Analysis 
Table 6 shows the parameters to the olden benchmarks. We mainly follow the 
parameters provided by Trimaran [86]. The pointer chasing cases are rare in those 
programs. In our experiments, we assume that the pointer table has the start and end 
address. The dynamic aspect evaluation is based on this assumption. 
Table 6. Olden benchmark parameter. 
Benchmark Parameter 
Bh 512 
Bisort 10000 
Health 4 250 1 
Mst 128 1 
Perimeter 6 1 
Treeadd 13 
Tsp 20 1 
Union 6 4 
Voronoi N/A 
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(b) Used on the right hand side. 
Figure 32. Dynamic pointer assignments.  
Figure 32 shows the dynamic pointer assignments. Heap pointers and parameter 
pointers possess almost all right side of pointer assignments. Most of the pointer 
conversions are used to allocate space for new objects. The function calls involved in 
pointer assignment are mainly through calling recursive functions. The two benchmarks 
em3d and tsp use library functions like drand48 and srand48 that are not supported by 
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SimpleScalar [3], and the power program causes segmentation fault when compiled using 
MACH SUIF, so their dynamic results are not shown in the thesis. 
3.8.3 Recursive Function Analysis 
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Figure 33. Recursive and none recursive functions. 
Figure 33 shows the number of recursive and none recursive functions. On average, 
25% of the functions are recursive functions, ranging from 4% to 50%. Figure 34 shows 
the number of pointer assignments in recursive and none recursive functions. On average, 
47% of the pointer assignments are in the recursive functions, ranging from 0% to 97%. 
Both of the figures demonstrate that dividing the pointer table for the local pointers in 
recursive and none recursive functions is necessary due to the big number of pointer 
assignments in the recursive functions. Most of the pointer assignments in those 
benchmarks are used to create new heap objects or to visit the data structures. The 
pointers on the heap and the local pointers coexist in and interleave the pointer table. The 
live range of the pointers on the heap are long, and the live range of local pointers is 
limited to a function’s live record, which could result in a large amount of interspace in 
the pointer table.  
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Figure 34. Pointer assignment in recursive and none recursive functions. 
3.8.4 Performance Evaluation 
The performance measurement is shown in Figure 35. The y-axis is normalized, 
where 100% represents the original execution time of a program. Every benchmark has 
three columns. The first column is the original execution time. The second column is the 
execution time of our baseline. The third column is the execution time with all 
optimizations turned on. From the results, we can observe that the average performance 
degradation under the baseline update scheme is 31%, ranging from 2% to 76%. After all 
optimizations are turned on, the performance degradation finally decreases to 15%. The 
savings for the health benchmark is mainly due to the points-to set propagation. The 
update for its intermediate representations is discarded as long as they do not impact the 
object liveness. The bisort benchmark overhead remains high since it uses two local 
pointers in a while loop to visit a binary tree and swaps the branches and leaves. The 
pointer assignment is like “pl=pll”, and then “pll=pl->left”. The update could change the 
object liveness. There is no type casting in the loop. If the points-to information is not 
needed urgently, the pointer’s target could be updated outside of the loop with the 
pointer’s value and type. The olden benchmarks make intensive use of pointers. In other 
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programs like SPEC benchmarks, only a few pointers are used, and the overhead is much 
smaller. 
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Figure 35. Updating overhead. 
 
3.8.5 Dynamic Load/Store 
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Figure 36. Cache effect. 
 
The number of dynamical load/store is shown in Figure 36. The y-axis is 
normalized, where 100% represents the original number of loads and stores executed by 
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the program. On average, our baseline increases the number of memory accesses by 34%, 
and our optimized algorithm increases the number of cache accesses by 17%. 
3.8.6 Space Cost 
Table 7. Pointer table size. 
Benchmark Heap pointer 
table size (byte) 
Static pointer  
table size (byte) 
Total pointer  
table size (byte) 
bh 6376 2232 8608
bisort 65552 976 66528
health 169728 464 170192
mst 132096 376 132472
perimeter 10688 352 11040
treeadd 65552 352 65904
union 32144 488 32632
voronoi 472 808 1280
 
Table 7 shows how much space is needed for the pointer table. From the table, we 
can observe that the heap pointer table is much bigger than the static pointer table. This is 
due to the intensive use of pointers in the olden benchmarks, especially involving 
numerous object allocations. The pointer table can go up to 17 KB with an average of 
5KB, that is tolerable for modern computers with large cache. For other normal 
applications that do not use pointer intensively, the pointer table size is usually small, 
which can be controlled under several KB. 
3.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we focus on the dynamic pointer tracking algorithms, the design 
issues, and possible optimization opportunities. Pointer tracking is generally a difficulty 
problem since C programming language allows tremendous ways to use pointers. We 
develop a new data structure to keep the points-to information, and propose several 
improvements to reduce the overhead. Overall, our study on the compiler analysis and the 
dynamic tracking could be customized applied to a wide range of applications and 
research areas. 
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CHAPTER 4  
MEMORY PROTECTION THROUGH DYNAMIC POINTER 
TRACKING 
4.1 Introduction of the Problem 
Software could suffer from various types of vulnerabilities, including buffer 
overflows, format string vulnerabilities, double frees, etc.[19]. Attackers devise clever 
techniques to exploit these vulnerabilities. If an attacker successfully exploits the 
vulnerability, the attacker can penetrate the system, and in most cases obtain the complete 
control over the system. According to the statistics from CERT [80], the number of 
vulnerabilities reported to CERT increased from 171 to 5990 during the period of 1995 to 
2005. Thus, the problem is becoming worse instead of going away. 
The fundamental way to solve the problem is to (re-) write secure code. But such 
efforts meet resistance due to the huge time to the market pressure, and the legacy issues 
due to the reused code. Thus, released software could contain various vulnerabilities. 
Since this situation is unlikely to change in the near future, countermeasures to attacks 
have been extensively investigated.  
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an important technology that is designed to offer 
memory protection. There are two types of intrusion detection systems. One is network 
based, which monitors network packets, and matches attack signatures in the packet 
content. The other kind is host based which resides in the host, and monitors the target 
system or the target program directly. In this work, we focus on host-based IDS. There 
are two general approaches proposed for host-based IDS. The first approach is based on 
signature checking. It detects attacks by using pre-identified intrusion signatures. Such 
approaches are accurate, but are unable to detect unknown attacks. Also, the signatures 
have to be constantly updated. Another approach is based on anomaly detection which is 
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our focus. It assumes the nature of an intrusion is unknown, but the intrusion somehow 
deviates from the program’s normal behavior. Anomaly detection based techniques are 
able to detect unknown attacks, and thus are more powerful. 
However, one important observation is that most of the previous anomaly detection 
work [33][72][62][32][43][46][35][34][44][77][22][63][14] focuses on monitoring 
program control flows and program paths. Control flow diversion has been successfully 
utilized by attackers previously to bypass the critical checking code or divert the 
execution to the injected malicious code. But with attacks becoming more and more 
sophisticated, control flow diversion may or may not be used as an attack technique. 
More fundamentally, though, memory tampering is the most common starting point used 
in starting and propagating an attack. Thus, one important question is whether monitoring 
program control flow is the right approach to detect the incidence of an attack. However, 
through our experiments, we found that a large percentage of memory tampering does not 
alter program control flows at all. For such memory tampering, monitoring control flows 
is pointless. In [13], Chen et al. showed several real non-control flow modifying data 
attacks. We will discuss those attacks in detail later, but the conclusion is that it is critical 
to detect data tampering that does not alter control flows.   
Another solution for memory protection is bounds checking for arrays and pointers 
[27][42][5][36]. Misuse of pointers and arrays could result in memory corruption, but 
they are not the root cause of memory tampering. Thus, the important question one may 
naturally ask is that what the foundation of memory tampering is. To tamper with 
memory, an attacker must exploit an existing or an inserted store instruction to modify 
memory as the attacker desires. To detect memory attacks, we have to start from the 
general store instructions instead of purely relying on some special attack models or 
aggregate properties. 
Store instruction based memory intrusion detection approaches did not really start to 
become an issue until recently [79][76][14]. This is mainly due to the hardness of pointer 
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analysis. However, most of these mechanisms cannot offer memory protection at fine 
level. Thus, how to get the exact points-to set and how to detect memory tampering at 
fine granularity becomes an important issue that has to be addressed.  
In this work, we propose a dynamic access control based intrusion detection system 
with compiler support to detect data tampering directly. Our system is not only dealing 
with memory safety, but also is preventing memory intrusions due to attacks. The 
dynamic pointer tracking technique is a key enabling component in this design to achieve 
full memory protection at fine level. The basic idea is that the compiler identifies 
program regions, in which data should not be accessed according to the program 
semantics. The compiler conveys this information to the hardware, and the hardware 
checks data accesses based on the information. If the compiler asserts that the data should 
not be accessed, but there is an attempt to do so at runtime, an attack is detected. To 
achieve security at fine granularity, we further maintain some data structures to monitor, 
and control the data access dynamically. Although security carries a performance penalty, 
our analysis indicates that it is possible to explore optimizations to reduce the cost 
significantly. The main contributions of this work are:  
(1) We design some data structures dynamically tracking the pointer activities.  
(2) We offer a secure solution at fine level.  
(3) We propose an intrusion detection system to detect a broad class of memory 
tampering.  
In this chapter, we show the design and implementation of our intrusion detection 
system with dynamic pointer tracking. 
4.2 Previous Approaches 
Memory intrusion detection involves a great amount of work. In this section, we 
briefly discuss some memory protection related work to motivate the need for our 
intrusion detection system. To be effective, we divide the previous work in four 
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categories – control flow monitoring, non-control attack detection, bounds checking, and 
other memory protection techniques.  
4.2.1 Control Flow Monitoring 
First, we discuss the memory protection schemes based control flow monitoring. 
Unknown software attacks can be detected through anomaly detection techniques by 
monitoring a program’s behavior, and comparing it with the expected behavior. Up until 
now, most anomaly detection research focuses on monitoring a program’s control flow 
behavior at different levels of granularity. 
Forrest et al. [33] found that the system call trace appears to be a good starting point 
for anomaly detection. System calls are generated as the program interacts with the 
kernel, examples of which are fopen(), fgets(), and fclose(). A system call trace can be 
considered as a distilled execution trace of a program leaving many program structures 
out.  
 Various system call monitoring based anomaly detection schemes have been 
proposed. The scheme in [33] tries to detect attacks by checking whether a small segment 
of the system call trace is normal. Finite State Automata (FSA) based techniques are also 
proposed to encode the expected system call trace information [46][72][62][67]. To 
construct the FSA for system call monitoring, every program statement invoking a 
system call becomes a state on the state machine diagram. The transitions between states 
are triggered by system calls. Each transition edge in the FSA is labeled by triggering a 
system call, and the target state is determined by the feasible control flows. The state 
machine can be easily constructed through a static analysis of the program [72] or by 
dynamically learning the system call trace and the program counter [62]. The main goal 
of system call monitoring is to detect how/whether an attacker is bypassing/creating an 
unusual trace. Although the most common class of attacks they detect is buffer 
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overflows, they could also detect other attacks like Trojan horses and format string 
attacks. But these attacks must cause some malicious function calls. 
Later work points out that simply checking the FSA for system calls is not sufficient 
and misses certain attacks. For instance, Wagner et al. noticed that impossible paths may 
occur at call/return sites that an attacker can exploit [72]. This can cause anomalous 
control flows along those paths to be undetected. They propose a second model called the 
abstract stack model, which records the call stack information to solve the problem. In 
[32], the authors observed that even the abstract stack model can miss important attacks. 
Thus, in [32] they provide a solution called vtPath to detect certain attacks missed 
previously by considering more program information. By constructing two hash tables 
that store not only the possible return addresses but also the so-called virtual paths (i.e. 
the sequence of procedure entry/exit points and return addresses traversed between two 
system calls), more attacks can be detected. However, [32] also acknowledges that some 
attacks are still left undetected.  
[44] incorporates system call arguments into the detection model, which is yet 
another example of incorporating more program information into the detection model. 
Most recently, [35] categorizes system call based anomaly detection systems into “black 
box”, “gray box”, and “white box” approaches. Systems that rely not only on the system 
call numbers, but also on the extra information extracted from the process memory fall 
into the “gray box” category. [35] further systematically studies the design space of “gray 
box” approach, and analyzes the importance of monitoring granularity with respect to the 
accuracy of systems. Their follow up work [34] gives a new “gray box” anomaly 
detection technique called the execution graph, which only accepts system call sequences 
consistent with the program control flow graph. However, due to the limitation of 
monitoring granularity (similar to [32]), execution graph is not able to detect certain 
attacks. 
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[73] develops a framework targeting soft timer based attacks. They maintain a 
database to record the legitimate soft timer interrupt requests. First, the transitive closure 
of all legitimate software timer interrupt request callback functions is constructed. Then, 
the symbolic soft timer interrupt request signatures are generated. Finally, the interrupt 
checker is placed in a secure domain to prevent the attacker from transferring the control 
from the guest kernel to the shell code. This work still relies on monitoring the soft 
interrupt triggered control flows. 
In summary, monitoring granularity at a system call granularity level is not fine 
enough to detect many attacks in reality, since an attack could take place between two 
system calls. Privilege escalation is a type of attack that modifies memory to hijack root 
privileges, which may not lead to anomalous system call trace, but which does lead to 
anomalous control flow. Program shepherding [42] is a protection mechanism against 
control-flow hijacking. It does not rely on system call monitoring, but enforces several 
rules of control transfers. The attacks detected by program shepherding are quite limited. 
Recently, Zhang et al. [77] proposed an anomalous path checking technique with the 
hardware support to monitor segments of dynamic program paths. The idea is similar to 
the one in [33], but their monitoring granularity is finer, and the detection strength is 
better. However, their scheme still focuses on control flows solely, and tries to detect 
attacks by identifying suspicious control flows.   
Control flow diversion has been successfully utilized by attackers previously to 
bypass critical checking code/divert execution to the injected malicious code. But with 
attacks becoming more and more sophisticated, control flow diversion may or may not be 
used as an attack technique. For such non-control memory tampering, monitoring control 
flows is pointless. Next, we show some mechanisms to detect non-control flow data 
attacks. 
4.2.2 Non-control Data Attack Detection 
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Figure 37. Attack without control flow tampering. 
In [13], Chen et al. showed non-control data attacks are very realistic, and should be 
given a serious attention. Figure 37 gives a piece of code from the Wu-FTP version 2.6 
showing a non-control data attack example. It contains a format string vulnerability that 
allows an attacker to modify any memory location. In normal situations, this piece of 
code temporarily escalates the user privilege using seteuid(0) to perform the setsockopt 
operation. Then it restores the original user privilege. But consider a scenario in which 
pw pw_uid is tampered with, and is set to 0 through a format string attack. In this case, 
the second seteuid operation will always grant the attacker with the root privilege, 
although it is supposed to restore the original user privilege. So the attacker is able to 
retain the root privilege, and do all damages subsequently. Note that there is no control 
flow modification involved in this process. 
Recently, some new approaches could deal with some kinds of non-control data 
attacks [1][79][76][14], although they may be originally developed for other purposes.  
AccMon [79] is a software debugging tool with the hardware support to detect 
software bugs leading to memory corruptions. The scheme is based on the observation 
that a memory location is typically only accessed by a few instructions. In their work, a 
set of data objects is selected to be monitored. They use profiling to create an invariants 
table, recording the set of instructions that normally access the selected data object. At 
runtime, the program is monitored through the compiler inserted operations. If a data 
object is accessed by an instruction not observed during training, an alarm is raised. Their 
FILE * getdatasock( … ) { 
... 
seteuid(0); 
setsockopt( ... ); 
... 
seteuid(pw->pw_uid); 
... 
}  
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scheme relies on profiling/training, so it may have false alarms. Moreover, since it is 
based on profiling, an instruction is regarded as legal to access a data object when it 
accesses that data object during any normal program execution, even though under a 
specific execution, it may be illegal for that instruction to access that data object. This 
leaves potential holes to be exploited by attackers. Figure 38 shows a simple example. 
Assume that the program accepts two kinds of user input. If the user input is user_input1, 
the pointer ptr points to obj1; if the user input is user_input2, ptr points to obj2. Later, the 
pointer is dereferenced at the instruction deref_inst. Under the AccMon scheme, in 
profiling (due to the issues of coverage during training), both kinds of user inputs are 
exercised, and the dereference instruction S1 is regarded as legal to access both obj1 and 
obj2. But during a specific execution context of the program, the pointer can only either 
point to obj1 or obj2, but never point to both obj1 and obj2. So if the user input is 
user_input1, ptr is illegal to access obj2, but AccMon regards it is legal. Thus an attacker 
could gain illegal access to obj2 and tamper with it without being detected. Their memory 
protection strength is weakened mainly due to their lack of precise points-to information. 
Thus, dynamic pointer tracking plays a key role in software protection. 
 
Figure 38. Security hole in AccMon. 
Mondrian memory protection [76] is a micro-architectural framework that enables 
fine-grained memory protection supporting multiple protection domains. They target 
sharing memory and exporting services. The kernel set the data access permissions. Then, 
at runtime, the data access policies are checked for every data access. It defines access 
permissions possibly at the granularity of per word in a permission table. At runtime, the 
ptr = NULL; 
… 
if ( user_input1 ) 
ptr = & obj1; 
else if (user_input2) 
ptr = & obj2; 
S1: *ptr = …  // deref_inst 
… 
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value in the address register is used to lookup the permission table to see if the domain 
has appropriate access permissions. There are three limitations in their approach. First, 
they assume the kernel is trusted, but our approach makes no assumption regarding the 
kernel. Second, the access permissions are preset by the user, which reduces the scope 
where their technique is applicable. Third, in their system, the kernel manages the access 
permissions based on protection domains, but we derive the access permissions 
information from the program automatically with careful analysis, and the access ranges 
are updated dynamically based on the current context. The program semantics enable us 
to protect memory in a better way.  
The object level memory tampering detection algorithm proposed by Zhang et al. [1] 
controls the access permissions for data objects dynamically. They use a table to collect 
the information regarding which object should be accessed by which store instruction. 
The table is statically created through the semantic analysis of a program. At runtime, all 
store instructions are checked regarding their access permissions. Any attempt to modify 
a read-only object triggers an alarm. There are three major problems in their design. They 
could not handle pointer dereference store instructions. In their work, they use the profile 
to estimate the behavior of pointers. However, without the precise points-to information, 
full memory protection could not be achieved. Dealing with pointer dereference is 
difficult. Static compiler pointer analysis has a large number of limitations, and in some 
cases cannot determine an accurate points-to set for a pointer dereference. In their work, 
before/after a pointer dereferencing instruction, the access permissions of all possible 
pointed-to objects have to be set, which could increase the protection overhead 
significantly. If we choose not to handle these cases, we have to give up protecting the 
dereferencing instructions, and a large number of locations would be exposed to 
attackers. Thus, such solutions are unacceptable. The other option is to undertake 
dynamic pointer tracking to discover the accurate pointer targets at runtime. In this work, 
we choose the latter option.  
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The profiling based analysis [79] is based on the relation of a store instruction and 
its referent-object. First, it determines the set of objects that are accessed by a store 
instruction in the training runs. Only the set of objects are supposed to be legally written 
by the store instruction. Then, at runtime, if a store instruction attempts to write an object 
that is not in the set, an alarm is raised. This approach has the same problem as [1] due to 
their profile based points-to set estimation. 
Infoshield [65] proposed a framework to protect the sensitive information against 
theft with little overhead. The tool recognizes the use pattern of the sensitive data, and 
instruments the program with verifications on the sensitive data access. At runtime, the 
address of the sensitive information is enrolled with the instructions that are allowed to 
access the contents of the address. Every load and store instruction is checked to ensure 
that they are the legal instructions. Their work has two limitations. First, they predefine 
the sensitive information, and only focus on that data, which weakens their protection 
strength. Second, they require the program developers to provide annotations indicating 
which data is sensitive, which adds the development overheads.    
4.2.3 Bounds Checking  
Jones and Kelly [40] proposed a referent-object based bounds checking approach. 
Later, [61] revised Jones and Kelly’s work to handle the out-of-bounds pointers in a 
similar way. A referent-object is an object that is pointed by a pointer. They dynamically 
maintain an object table to keep the address and the size of all objects. To determine if a 
new address computed based on a pointer is in-bounds, a checker searches the object 
table for the referent-object of the pointer. Then, the checker verifies whether the new 
address falls within the extent of the referent-object. They modify the program to keep 
the object table up to date. Our approach differs from theirs. We aim at protecting 
memory; they target bounds checking only for arrays and pointers. The table in their 
scheme involves huge overheads, since whenever an operation on an array or a pointer is 
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performed the table has to be searched to get the object that the array or the pointer 
refers; our data structures are well designed as direct access tables so that the checking 
process speeds up.  
In [51], George Necula et al. proposed a type safe system for C programming 
language. They used formal methods to design the type system. They derived new pointer 
representations and new operations on pointers to guarantee the safe pointer dereference. 
Our work is different from theirs. First, CCured maintains the points-to information (like 
the start address and the end address) in memory around the pointer; we collect the 
information in one integrated table (i.e. the pointer table). The start address and the end 
address of a pointer are security sensitive. If this important data is not well protected, an 
attacker could modify the address of a pointer, thus tamper with the program. Second, our 
technique could be extended to provide a hardware based IDS due to the integrated data 
structure design.  
Purify [36] keeps a state for each memory byte. It supports three states, unallocated, 
allocated and unintialized, allocated and initialized. The transition between states is 
determined by memory allocation and initialization. The memory access is intercepted to 
lookup, check, and update the state table. Memory access inconsistent with the state code 
causes an alert message. There are two big concerns about their work. One is the two-bit 
state code for every byte in memory, which could consume 25% more space. Second is 
the function call that is used to trap every memory access, which could cause a factor of 
5.5 slowdown over the optimized C code.  
Pure software based memory error detection incurs high overhead. MemTracker 
[71] proposes a similar idea as Purify with the hardware support. They design several 
events, a programmable state transition table and a dedicated control register to speed up 
the state table lookup step. It shows that the decrease the performance overhead in 
SPEC2000 is under 5%. Their work demonstrates that hardware assisted design is critical 
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to remove the performance barrier. However, the space cost remains the same, which 
hinders the scalability. 
Hardbound [26] improves the fat pointer approach by developing a hardware 
bounded pointer architectural primitive that enforces special memory safety for C 
programs with both hardware and software help. The compiler finds where the pointers 
are defined. The hardware maintains the shadow base and bounds information for every 
register and memory word in a sidecar shadow space. The hardware propagates the 
bounds information of a pointer, and checks a pointer dereference against the bounds. 
The metadata is separated from the pointer and it is encoded to reduce the overheads. 
Their design has two major advantages. First, the fat pointer metadata is hidden by the 
hardware, so the memory data layout is not changed, which provides compatibility with 
uninstrumented code. Second, the hardware speeds up the updating and checking process. 
SoftBound [50] proposes similar work as ours. They centralize the metadata in a 
lookup table. The program is instrumented at pointer assignment places to update the 
lookup table. They implement two types of lookup tables (hash table and shadow space). 
Our work differs from theirs at three aspects. First, the attack models are different. They 
focus on the load and store instructions through pointer dereference; our work is designed 
as a general solution protecting all store instructions against memory tampering. Second, 
focusing on the memory protection based on indirect memory store instructions through 
pointer dereference incurs 54% (for the hash table implementation) and 22% (for the 
shadow space implementations) overheads. In this work, we develop kinds of 
optimizations to improve both of the dynamic pointer tracking and the memory protection 
technique, which controls the performance degradation under 15%. Third, the narrowing 
of bounds in their work could trigger false alarms, which is not desirable by the program 
developers. 
4.2.4 Other Approaches 
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There are some papers using code transformation and encryption techniques to 
protect memory [41][15][28][70][38][51][6][30][66][52][47]. Kirovski et zal. [41] 
proposed an intrusion detection system (SPEF) with the architectural and compilation 
support. SPEF inserts encrypted constraints to every block of instructions, and then 
verifies the constraints at runtime. Crispin Cowan et al. [20] presented PointGuard, a 
compiler technique to defend against most of buffer overflows by encrypting the pointers 
when the pointers are stored in memory. These techniques could be breached by smart 
attackers in a brute-force way. 
4.2.5 Previous Work against Attacks 
Memory intrusion detection involves a great amount of work. In this section, we 
briefly discuss three memory tampering attack examples to motivate the need for our 
intrusion detection system. To be effective, we choose five relatively new memory 
protection techniques as typical representatives for comparison. They are the bounds 
checking technique [40], the non-control data protection algorithm [1], the word level 
memory protection approach [79], the control flow monitoring solution [77], and the 
profile based intrusion detection mechanism [79]. 
First, we describe the three memory tampering attacks. Buffer overflow is one of the 
most popular memory attacks. One example buffer overflow attack is shown in Figure 
39, where an attacker is attempting to use a long input to overrun the buffer from the field 
username to another field dir through the statement S1. Another common kind of attack is 
double free that exploits the program vulnerabilities through incorrect invocations of the 
free function. One instance of the double free attack happens at the statement S6. The 
only thing the attacker needs to do is to lead the program to execute the statements S3 
and S6. The object NewUser is freed twice, which could result in program crashes. The 
third example is the off-by-one problem as shown at the statement S7. Next, we discuss 
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the five memory protection techniques and show how they cannot detect all above 
example attacks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39. Memory attack example. 
 
One disadvantage of the bounds checking work in [40] is that they do not check the 
bounds for arrays or pointers defined in a structure. The buffer overflow attack example 
shown in Figure 39 at the statement S1 cannot be detected, since username is defined 
within the structure NewUser. Modern programs tend to use complex nested data 
structures. Their analysis granularity restricts their work from detecting program errors at 
fine level.  
struct UserInfo{ 
char username[20]; 
char * dir; 
char  passwd[20]; 
int group; 
} UserInfo; 
… 
Foo() { 
struct UserInfo NewUser; 
int array[10], i; 
… 
S1: scanf(“%s”, NewUser.username); 
ReadPasswd(NewUser.passwd);  
… 
if (NewUser.group == 1){ 
S2:  NewUser.dir = DefaultBuf; 
S3:  free(NewUser.dir); 
} 
else if(NewUser.group == 2){ 
S4:  NewUser.dir = Buf2; 
S5:  scanf(“%s”, NewUser.dir); 
  } 
S6: free(NewUser.dir); 
… 
for(i = 0; i <= 10; i++)  
S7: array[i] = 0; 
} 
Buffer overflow attack
Input: aaaaa…aaaaa 
double free vulnerability 
Off by one error 
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The memory tampering detection algorithm [1] could not protect memory 
completely due to that their points-to set analysis based on the profile compromises their 
protection strength. Look at the if-else statement in Figure 39. If in the training runs, the 
statement S2 is executed more frequently than the statement S4, the estimated points-to 
object of the pointer NewUser->dir should be DefaultBuf. Suppose that in the testing run, 
the variable NewUser->group is equal to 2, and the pointer NewUser->dir should point to 
another buffer other than DefaultBuf. In this case, the store instruction at the statement S5 
will not be checked, since the current object pointed by the pointer NewUser->dir does 
not fall into the estimated points-to set. To solve the problem, at runtime, dynamic 
program monitor must be proposed to get the exact points-to set. 
For the code segment shown in Figure 39, in the Mondrian Memory Protection work 
[76], consider a scenario that the permission key for the object NewUser is enabled in 
advance due to some data sharing concerns. When the statement S1 is executed, the 
Mondrian Memory Protection will let the buffer overflow attack go unchecked.  
The limitation of all control flow monitoring based techniques like [77] is that they 
cannot detect attacks that do not modify control flows. One simple example is that 
off-by-one problem shown at the statement S7 in Figure 39. 
For this example, the profiling based technique [79] would raise a false positive at 
the statement S5 in a simple scenario. Assume in the training runs, the statement S2 is 
executed, but the statement S4 is never executed, thus the set of objects that is supposed 
to be written by S5 is empty. In the evaluation run, the statement S4 is executed. 
According the implementation in [79], the checker verifies the store instruction at S5, and 
claims that this store instruction has no right to write the object NewUser->dir since 
NewUser->dir is not supposed to be a referent-object of the store instruction. This 
triggers a false positive which is not desired by the developer. 
None of these memory protection techniques could detect the example attacks, due 
to the fact that previous memory protection solutions may only protect software against 
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certain attacks under some constraints, and due to the hardness of dynamic analysis. In 
this work, we propose a general solution to protect against all memory attacks. 
4.2.6 Our Approach 
In this work, we propose and implement an intrusion detection system with the 
compiler support to detect data tampering directly. Our approach aims at protecting all 
program data. We tackle the root cause of memory attacks by detecting data corruptions 
directly.  
Briefly, the compiler first determines which memory access should be restricted, and 
inserts the code necessary for updating the access control dynamically. Then, at runtime, 
the memory accesses are checked regarding the access permissions. In the design, the 
dynamic pointer tracking is a key component, since it enables us to extract the precise 
access range information. This leads to superior attack detection strength. Our static data 
flow analysis is conservative, thus there is no false positives, which greatly improves the 
applicability of the scheme. Due to C semantics, the dynamic updates could be frequent, 
so maintaining these data structures is expensive. We further propose a solution to 
eliminate the redundant updating operations. Thus, we provide per memory access fine 
granularity memory protection. There are many implementation issues and optimization 
opportunities, which are detailed in the following.  
4.3 Attack Model  
Our attack model is based on memory tampering. We assume that all store 
instructions are attacking instructions. Our technique is not restricted to some specific 
kinds of attacks. We do not make any assumption about attack initiation mechanisms 
(such as whether it is coming from input injection, malicious code injection, memory 
snooping etc.) except that its end goal is to perform memory tampering.  
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Scope and Limitations. Currently our compiler transformation is only applied to 
the user program, the statically linked libraries and some attack sensitive functions in 
dynamically linked libraries (like scanf, printf, strcpy, recv, free, strcat). The program 
code is set read-only after it is compiled and linked. The effectiveness of our scheme is 
determined by the knowledge about memory access instructions that the compiler can 
obtain statically. Our scheme is most effective when the compiler knows exactly which 
single variable a memory write instruction is going to access. In those cases, the baseline 
scheme shown below can provide protection from any memory tampering.  
4.4 Compiler Analysis and Optimizations 
 This section presents our protection scheme. We first introduce some important 
definitions used in our technique. 
Definition 1: A memory object is a data object defined in a program and resides in 
the memory. Memory objects include local stack data objects, static global data objects 
and dynamically allocated heap data objects. Common memory objects are scalar 
variables, arrays and aggregated structures etc. 
Definition 2: An access permission level of a memory object is either writable, or 
read-only. 
Definition 3: A protection point is a program point where the access permission 
levels of some memory objects are changed by setting the corresponding access bits for 
those memory objects.  
Definition 4: A protection operation at a protection point is denoted as the action of 
changing the access permission levels of some memory objects at this point. Generally, 
there are two types of protection operations – changing from writable to read-only and 
changing from read-only to writable. 
4.4.1 Baseline Scheme 
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First, we discuss a most basic implementation of our idea. In such a baseline 
scheme, every memory object has a corresponding access bit containing the access 
permission level for it. There are two types of protection points – before a store 
instruction and right after a store instruction. Assume that a memory object “O” is written 
by the store instruction. The access permission level for O is changed to writable right 
before the store instruction and is changed back to read-only after the store instruction. 
Initially, all memory objects access permissions are set to be read-only. During the 
execution of the program, whenever a store instruction is to be executed, the hardware 
checks the access bit table to see whether this instruction violates the memory access 
permission, i.e. writing a memory object whose access permission is read-only. If there is 
a violation, it alerts the attempted attack. Note that the memory corruption has to be done 
by some store instructions in a software-based attack. This store instruction could be 
some existing instruction in the program but writing a memory object that it is not 
supposed to. A second possibility is that this store instruction could be injected by an 
attacker. In either case the tampering is detected by our scheme. 
The baseline scheme can prevent memory corruption attacks completely. In other 
words, all memory objects can be protected from being attacked. But it is infeasible to 
realize this complete protection mechanism due to the very large overhead of setting and 
checking access permissions. Thus, we propose three compiler optimizations to reduce 
the performance overhead in a significant way while maintaining the memory protection 
strength at a fine granularity level. We empirically show how strong protection can be 
achieved for typical attack models with minimized performance degradation.  
4.4.2 Compiler Framework Overview 
The compiler’s task is to analyze the program, optimize the baseline scheme, collect 
the information about how to properly set up memory objects access permission and 
convey this information to the runtime component.  
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Figure 40. Compiler framework overview. 
Figure 40 depicts our compiler framework. There are eight steps. First, the static 
pointer analysis is used to find which memory objects a pointer points. Second, all store 
instructions are identified by the compiler. All program points right before/after store 
instructions are treated as initial protection points as we stated in the baseline. Third, all 
write range information is collected to determine where to conduct the protection (we 
will talk about write ranges later). Forth, the hot protection points are hoisted/delayed to 
cold basic blocks. Then given some performance degradation constraints, the least 
beneficial protection points are removed. Next, some memory objects are grouped to be 
protected together whenever such an opportunity exists. An action table recording 
protection points and corresponding protection operations is created. So is a pointed-to 
table used to assist the handling of pointer dereferences. Finally special instructions are 
inserted into the code to inform the processor when to look up the action table. Details 
about the above steps follow. 
Identify initial protection points 
Identify write ranges 
Hoist and delay protection points 
Select protection points 
Group variables 
Build points-to table and action table 
Pointer analysis 
Insert special instructions 
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Figure 41. Write range example. 
4.4.3 Write Range Identification 
A write range is similar to the live range of a variable, except that the starting point 
of a write range is a store instruction on a memory object, and the ending point is the next 
closest store instructions on the same memory object. A write range is used to identify 
protection pairs – given a “set to writable” protection operation, what are its 
corresponding “set to read-only” protection operations, or on the other hand, what are the 
related “set to writable” protection operations for a “set to read-only” protection 
operation. Every pointer assignment is treated as a store instruction. Statically, if a store 
instruction is through a pointer dereference, and the pointer’s points-to objects may be 
aliased with the variable used in another store instruction, then a write range exists 
between the two store instructions. The information is collected to assist the later 
optimization phases. 
Figure 41 gives an example to show the write ranges of a variable v. There are five 
store instructions on v in five basic blocks, resulting in three write ranges – WR1, WR2 
and WR3. One from “str r1 v” to “str r3 v”, one from “str r2 v” to “str r3 v”, and another 
B2B1 str r1 v 
… 
str r2 v 
… 
str r3 v 
… 
str r4 v 
p = &v 
… 
str r5 v 
 
B3
B4
B5
WR2
WR3
WR1
… 
str r6 *p WR4B6
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from “str r3 v” to “str r4 v” and “str r5 v”. The three write ranges do not include the store 
instructions themselves. In other words, a write range starts at the point right after a store 
instruction and ends just before the nearest next store instruction for the same variable. In 
the block B4, a pointer p points to v. The pointer evaluation determines that the five store 
instructions are aliased with the pointer dereference store in the B6. A write range WR4 
is recognized upon the identification of aliased stores. 
We utilize the standard framework of webs to identify write ranges. A write range’s 
starting and ending points are program points where protection operations should be 
performed initially. In the above example, the access permission level for v should be set 
to read-only at the start of WR1, and it should be changed back to writable at the end of 
WR1. It is the same for WR2, WR3 and WR4. Thus, protection points are the boundaries 
of write ranges. 
4.4.4 Protection Points Hoisting and Delaying 
The large overhead of complete memory protection by setting access permissions at 
all protection points is mainly due to that some store instructions are executed many 
times. For example, in some multimedia encoding applications, the encoding process is 
done in a major loop executed a very large number of times; while other code outside the 
loop body is seldom touched. Hoisting/delaying a protection point out of the loop body 
would afford us more efficient protection mechanisms. This observation motivates us to 
come up with an optimization to move the protection operations from a hot basic block to 
a cold basic block whenever possible.  
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Figure 42. Algorithm for hoisting protection points. 
Figure 42 gives the pseudo code for our hoisting algorithm. Starting from a hot basic 
block containing a protection point, we go back along the edges in the control flow graph. 
Its predecessor basic blocks are pushed onto a stack for further processing. For a pointer 
dereference store instruction, the protection point cannot be hoisted cross the boundary 
where the pointer is defined. Before a pointer is defined, its points-to information is 
unknown, and we do not know which object should be allowed to write. We provide PD 
as the set of pointer definitions where the pointer is dereferenced in the store instruction. 
 
Func:  HoistPP 
Input: PP – a variable’s protection point set 
      PD – a variable’s related pointer definition set 
CFG – control flow graph of the program 
Profile – Hot/cold basic block information in the CFG 
Threshold – a threshold to make cost-benefit tradeoff 
Output: Optimized protection point set 
 
For each variable v 
  For each P∈PP[v] in a basic block B 
If (B is not hot) || (∃Q∈PP[v] in B and Q is before P) 
|| (∃Q∈PD[v] in B and Q is before P) 
  continue; 
    For each preprocessor BP of B 
      _push (BP, S)  
    EndFor 
HoistSet = ProcStack 
    //BP∈HoistSet 
    Hoist_benefit = B.freq – ∑ BP.freq     
    Hoist_cost = ∑ dynamic stores from BP to P 
    If (Hoist_benefit/Hoist_cost > threshold) 
      PP[v] = PP[v] – {PB} 
  PP[v] = PP[v] ∪HoistSet 
    EndIf 
  EndFor 
EndFor 
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Figure 43. Auxiliary algorithm for hoisting protection points. 
ProcStack in Figure 43 is an auxiliary function to explore the algorithm along 
backwards edges. It first examines the block on the top of the stack to see if it is hot. A 
basic block is said to be hot if its execution frequency exceeds some preset threshold. If it 
is cold, then we get one desired location to insert the protection operation. Otherwise, we 
should check whether we have reached a boundary – a basic block that contains another 
Func: ProcStack 
Input: PP – a variable’s protection point set 
      PD – a variable’s related pointer definition set 
CFG – control flow graph of the program 
Profile – Hot/cold basic block information in the CFG 
S – stack for processing 
P – the protection point to be hoisted 
BB – basic block where P is 
Output: HoistSet – Set of protection points that the original protection 
point is going to be hoisted to 
 
HoistSet = Null 
While (B = pop(S) != NULL ) 
B.visit = true; 
If(B is BB) 
  If(∃Q∈PP[v] in B and Q is after P) 
    return Null 
  Else 
    If B is hot  
      If ((∃P∈PP[v]) && (P is in B)) || ((∃P∈PD[v]) && (P is in B)) 
        return Null 
      Else 
        For each preprocessor BP of B 
          If B.visit = false 
            _push(BP, S) 
          Else 
            return Null 
          EndIf 
        EndFor 
      EndIf 
    Else 
      HoistSet = HoistSet∪ {B} 
    EndIf 
  EndIf 
EndWhile 
return HoistSet 
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protection point for the same memory object, or a pointer definition for the pointer 
dereference store. In other words, the algorithm determines if we have reached a program 
point where the object’s access permission level is just changed from writable to 
read-only, or a point where the pointer is just defined, so we have to stop here and leave 
the hot protection point for further optimizations. If the current basic block that is being 
processed is hot and it does not include any protection operation on the same memory 
object, we continue pushing its predecessor basic blocks onto the stack. A control flow 
graph may include loops, so we use a flag to indicate whether a basic block has been 
visited, and also check whether we come back to the same basic block where the store is. 
If the same basic block containing the protection point P is seem again, we have to check 
if there exists another store after P. If so, it means that we reach a loop and other stores 
on the same variable prevent us from hoisting the protection point.  
After obtaining the potential locations for hoisting a protection point, we determine 
whether to actually move the protection point out of the hot basic block based on a 
cost/benefit analysis. The benefit is denoted as the savings in terms of dynamically 
executed protection operations. The cost is defined in terms of the security degradation. 
Hoisting a protection point to a predecessor point means that the object could be 
corrupted between the two points. So it is not protected in that region. If the ratio of 
benefit/cost is bigger than a threshold, then the protection point is hoisted. Currently the 
threshold is determined by the system manually, which can be optimized using some 
heuristic solutions. 
Figure 44 gives a sub control flow graph showing how the hoisting algorithm works. 
There are two store instructions in blocks B2 and B8, generating four protection points, 
right before and after the two stores. Assume all blocks in the loop body are hot. It is easy 
to see that the protection point before the store in B2 can be taken out of the loop to the 
block B1. That means we can set the access permission level for v1 to writable at the end 
of B1 instead of in B2. Similarly, if B6 is cold and B8 is hot, then the protection point can 
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also be lifted from B8 to B6. On the other hand, if B6 is also hot, the hoisting algorithm 
has to proceed by processing blocks B5, B4, B3 and B2 until it meets another store for v 
in B2. Thus there are two opportunities of moving protection points from hot blocks to 
cold blocks in this example. 
 
Figure 44. An example of hoisting protection points. 
The benefit also comes with penalty – the degradation in security. If a write is only 
permitted just before the instruction “str r1 v”, the variable v is well protected. If the 
variable v is set to be writable at the end of B1, the attacker can possibly corrupt variable 
v during the program’s execution between the end of B1 and the store instruction. So a 
tradeoff must be made to balance the benefit and the cost. On the other hand, if there is 
no other store instruction between the end of B1 to the store instruction to variable v1, the 
protection remains intact or does not degrade at all. This is because the attacker has to 
execute a store instruction to corrupt a memory object. Thus, some motions of protection 
points actually do not result in security degradation if they don’t move the protection 
point past another store (which could be malignant).   
The similar algorithm is applied to delay the protection operation of changing the 
access permission from writable to read-only from a hot basic block to a cold one. Look 
… 
str r1 v
……
…
B2 
B3 B4 
B5 
 
… 
B1 
B6 
str r2 v 
… 
B8 
B7 
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at the example in Figure 44 again. Initially, variable v is set to be read-only right after 
“str r1 v” in B2. It could involve great overhead since B2 is hot. So if B6 is cold, we 
could delay this protection to B6. However, there is a relatively long path from B2 to B6. 
So the protection to variable v may be degraded significantly. In this case, the compiler 
determines whether it should be delayed or not after considering both the benefit and the 
cost similar to that of hoisting a protection operation (i.e. if benefit/cost is bigger than the 
threshold, it is decided to be delayed).  
4.4.5 Protection Points Selection 
Due to the big overhead, completely protecting all memory objects may not be 
feasible. So how to determine where and which memory object should be protected are 
the key issues addressed in this section.  
We build a cost/benefit analysis model to select protection points based on the 
profile data. The analysis unit is the set of protection points of a write range. All 
protection points for a write range have to be analyzed together since they are related 
operations. In other words, if a “set to read-only” operation for a memory object is 
removed, the corresponding “set to writable” operations are not necessary any more. On 
the other hand, if only the “set to writable” operation is deleted, its corresponding writes 
are not checked. Otherwise, the corresponding writes will be regarded as illegal and there 
will be false alarms.  
The benefit of removing a write range is denoted as the sum of the dynamically 
executed store instructions within the write range. In other words, the benefit corresponds 
to the protection offered to the number of stores in a given range and is therefore 
proportional to the number of stores. Benefit means how many store instructions we 
could protect if we have the write range. The cost of a write range is defined as the sum 
of the dynamic execution times of all protection points in this write range. The cost 
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means how many overheads we have for keeping the protection point. The cost is equal 
to the sum of the frequencies of basic blocks where the protection points are located. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 45. Algorithm for selecting protection points. 
Figure 45 shows the pseudo code for the algorithm to choose the most profitable 
memory objects to be protected.  The algorithm first analyzes the cost/benefit for all 
write ranges. The weight of a write range is based on the cost/benefit tradeoff which 
indicates its priority in terms of protection. The weight is equal to WR.benefit/WR.cost. 
Func: SelectPP 
Input: AllWR – write ranges set 
  Threshold – performance degradation constraint  
Output: Optimized write ranges set 
 
CompCostBenefit 
// WR∈AllWR 
performance_degradation = ∑ WR.cost 
While (performance_degradation > threshold) 
 WR∈AllWR with minimum weight 
 AllWR = AllWR – {WR} 
 Performance_degradation -= WR.cost 
EndWhile 
Func: CompCostBenefit 
Input: AllWR – write ranges set 
Profile – Hot/cold basic blocks information in the CFG 
Output: Weight of each write range 
 
For each variable v 
  For each WR∈AllWR[v] 
    WR.benefit = ∑ (dynamic stores within WR) 
    WR.cost = ∑ (instruction at protection point in WR) 
WR.weight = tradeoff(WR.beneft, WR.cost) 
  EndFor 
EndFor 
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Then, driven by the performance degradation constraint, the algorithm repeats removing 
write ranges until the degradation requirement is satisfied. 
As an example, consider the control flow graph in Figure 44. If the “set to 
read-only” operation cannot be delayed from B2, we re-evaluate its benefit and cost in 
this compiler pass to determine if such a protection point should be deleted. 
4.4.6 Grouping Protection Operations  
In this section, we introduce a compiler technique called protection operations 
grouping. Normally, each protection point corresponds to one protection operation that 
incurs certain runtime overhead. However, interesting optimization opportunities exist 
when multiple protection points performing the same type of operations are clustered 
together and the memory objects they protect are adjacent in memory. In these cases, 
instead of incurring one protection operation for each protected memory object, the 
protection operations can be grouped together as one protection operation for all memory 
objects at the clustering point. Figure 46 shows a simple example. Assume variables v1 
and v2 are adjacent to each other. The start address of v1 is addr1 and the size of it is 
size1. The start address of v2 is addr1+size1 and the size of it is size2. Instead of setting 
access permission levels of v1 and v2 separately, we can group the operations and set the 
access permission level of the memory region with start address as addr1 and with size as 
size1+size2. The grouped protection operation achieves better performance since it 
reduces the number of dynamic protection operations and the associated runtime 
overhead. 
Such optimization opportunities occur when there are multiple protection operations 
clustered together and when the memory objects protected at the clustering point are 
adjacent to each other. We can easily create clustered protection operations when there 
are multiple adjacent store instructions as shown in Figure 46. In our scheme, the 
compiler tries to move store instructions together as long as their dependencies are still 
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satisfied. Also, after the protection point hoisting/delaying algorithm is performed, many 
protection operations tend to be grouped at the same program point, such as the 
beginning/ending of a cold basic block.  
 
Figure 46. An example of protection operations grouping. 
After clustered protection operations are identified, we need to properly lay out the 
memory objects to exploit the optimization opportunities. Note that the memory objects 
layout is a global decision rather than a local decision with respect to a given protection 
point. Different memory layouts may be required to completely exploit protection 
operation grouping opportunities at different clustering points, but there could be only 
one memory layout for the program. Our goal is to find a layout of memory objects that 
can maximally exploit the protection operations grouping opportunities.  
Figure 47 gives an example showing how the data layout impacts the protection 
operations grouping. There are nine variables and four clustering points in this example. 
Figure 47 (b) and (c) show two possible data layouts of these variables in virtual memory. 
Data layout 1 scheme only allows us to perform the protections on v5, v8 and v9 together 
… 
set v1 to writable 
str r1, v1 
set v1 to read-only 
set v2 to writable 
str r1, v2 
d l
… 
str r1, v1 
str r1, v2 
… 
without protection baseline scheme 
… 
set v1and v2 to writable     clustering point P1 
str r1, v1 
str r1, v2 
set v1 and v2 to read-only    clustering point P2 
… 
after protection grouping 
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at P4 since only they are adjacent and there are protection operations on them at the same 
clustering point (i.e. P4). On the other hand, data layout 2 allows us to protect v1, v2, v3 
and v4 together at P1; to protect v5, v6 and v7 together at P2; to protect v8, v9 and v10 
together at P3; to protection v1, v2, v5 and v6 together at P4; and to protect v8 and v9 
together at P4. The two data layouts show substantial difference in grouping protection 
operations, so our goal is to find out the best way to layout the data so that maximum 
protection operations can be grouped. 
 
Figure 47. An example of data layout. 
The pseudo code of our algorithm to determine the memory object layout is shown 
in Figure 48. First, a variable group at a clustering point is identified. All objects with the 
same type, whose access permissions are changed in the same way at a clustering point 
form the variable group for the clustering point. Types of an object include initialized 
global object, un-initialized global object, heap object, and stack object. So there are at 
most four variable groups at a clustering point. Access permissions can be changed either 
from read-only to writable or from writable to read-only. The weight of a variable group 
… 
set v1, v2, v3 and v4 to read-only   clustering point P1 
… 
set v5, v6 and v7 to read-only      clustering point P2 
… 
set v8, v9 and v10 to read-only      clustering point P3 
… 
set v1, v2, v5, v6, v8, v9 to read-only   clustering point P4 
(a) clustering points 
(b) Data layout 1
  v1   v10    v6    v4    v8    v5   v9    v3    v7    v2 
  v3    v4    v1    v2    v5   v6    v7    v8    v9   v10
(c) Data layout 2
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is defined as the savings of dynamic protection operations if the protection operations for 
all variables in the variable group are grouped together at the given point. Then the 
algorithm starts from the variable group (say CurrVG) with the maximum weight. Note 
that we only deal with variable groups whose size is bigger than one since one element 
group does not provide any opportunity for optimization. Let ProcessedVG be the set of 
variable groups that have been processed. It is initialized to null. CommonVG includes 
variable groups that have common variables with CurrVG. The motivation behind 
identifying the set of common variables is to maximize linearize the variables in the 
group so that more protection operations can be removed.  We illustrate these concepts 
below through an example.  
We use the example in Figure 49 to explain our algorithm step by step. In this 
example, there are four groups VG1, VG2, VG3 and VG4 corresponding to the example 
in Figure 47.  Their weights are decreasing.  That means VG1 should be dealt with 
first, then VG2, VG3 and VG4. In processing VG1, both ProcessedVG and CommonVG 
are null, so VG1 is included in ProcessedVG. In processing VG2, since Processed VG 
only contains VG1 and there is no common variable for VG1 and VG2, CommonVG is 
also empty. VG2 is inserted into VG. Similarly, VG3 is also included in VG. Now VG 
contains VG1, VG2 and VG3. The last variable group is VG4, which has common 
variables with VG1, VG2 and VG3, so CommonVG includes VG1, VG2 and VG3. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 48. Pseudo code for the grouping algorithm. 
Func: ArrangeData 
Input: CommonVG – variable groups having common element with CurrVG 
Output: Arranged variable group 
 
ListGroup = null 
For each VG’ in CommonVG 
  CommonVar = VG’∩CurrVG 
    For each v in CommonVar 
    CurrVG = CurrVG – {v} 
    ListGroup = ListGroup –VG’ 
    VG’ = VG’ – {v} 
    NewListGroup = CreateListGroup(v, VG’) 
    ListGroup = CombineListGroup(ListGroup, NewListGroup) 
EndFor 
Func:  GroupVar 
Input:  AllVG – all variable groups 
Output: Optimized variable groups 
 
ProcessedVG = null 
While AllVG != null 
  CurrVG = SelectMaxWeightVG 
  AllVG = AllVG – {CurrVG} 
  If (CurrVG.size > 1) 
CommonVG =  VG’ | (VG’∈AllVG} & (VG’∩CurrVG != null)} 
ProcessedVG = ProcessedVG – CommonVG 
    If (CommonVG != null) 
      ProcessedVG = ProcessedVG∪ArrangeData  
    Else 
      ProcessedVG = ProcessedVG ∪ {CurrVG} 
    EndIf 
  EndIf  
EndWhile 
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Figure 49. An example of variable grouping algorithm. 
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Next we show how to use the common variables to clarify the spatial relationship of 
variables. For every variable group VG’ in CommonVG, let CommonVar be the set of 
common variables of CurrVG and VG’. For each variable v in CommonVar, it is taken 
out of the variable group first. The remaining variables in the variable group form a new 
variable group. Next v is connected to the new variable group to create NewListGroup 
that is in a special form – listgroup. Listgroup is a special structure containing both lists 
and groups. A group means that variables in it could be grouped together, but it does not 
tell us the exact layout of the variables, i.e. which variable should be adjacent to which 
variable in the virtual memory. So the variable can be linearized in many ways. But 
considering all variable groups, a variable should be preferred to be the neighbor of 
another variable to optimize overall protection operations. So a list is designed to 
represent the linear data layout of the variables.  Finally NewListGroup is combined 
with original ListGroup to build current ListGroup. 
To make it more clear, look at the example in Figure 49 again. VG1 is taken from 
CommonVG first. CommonVar includes v1 and v2. Initially ListGroup is set to be 
empty. v1 is first removed out of VG1. Note that although the variable group has priority 
based on their weights, variables in the same group have the same priority. That means it 
does not matter if we deal with v1 or v2 first. Now the new VG1 only has v2, v3 and v4. 
NewListGroup is created containing two elements, v1 and the new VG1. Then 
NewListGroup is combined with ListGroup. Since the original ListGroup is empty, 
current ListGroup is the same as NewListGroup as shown in Figure 49 (a). v1 is taken 
out as a special element connecting to the new VG1 since VG4 indicates that it is 
preferable for v1 to be grouped with other variables later, such as v2, v5 to reduce 
protection operations.  
The next variable in Common to be processed is v2. In this case, VG1 is picked 
from ListGroup. Currently VG1 is the set of v2, v3 and v4, so ListGroup only has v1. 
Then v2 is taken out of VG1 connecting to the new VG1 creating NewListGroup. Next 
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NewListGroup and ListGroup are combined as follows. In CombineListGroup, if both 
NewListGroup and ListGroup have ending variables (such as v2 in NewListGroup and v1 
in ListGroup) and they are both in CurrVG, then the ending variables are connected by an 
edge. An ending variable is a variable in a listgroup that has only one neighbor and not in 
a group. Thus, by connecting v1 and v2, we get the final ListGroup as shown in Figure 49 
(b). 
Besides scalar variables, we can also group array accesses. For example, if an array 
is written/read in a stride of 2, e.g., it accesses elements 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11…, we may group 
array elements 1, 3, 5 as a group and array elements 7,9,11 as a group. Array access 
analysis is an important topic in compiler optimizations especially for loop 
parallelization. It has been extensively studied in [53][21][12][23][58] . With array access 
information, array accesses can be grouped using standard techniques. For array accesses 
with a stride of 1, the problem is very similar to loop vectorization. For array accesses 
with a stride greater than 1, loop scatter-gather can be done first to create a loop 
accessing the same data with a stride of 1. Of course any transformation cannot violate 
the original program dependencies. All the techniques involved are elaborated in [69] . 
Being able to handle arrays is important to reduce security cost for the whole program 
since a large percentage of dynamic memory accesses go to aggregated data structures, 
most of them being arrays. 
4.5 Data Structure Design 
4.5.1 Action Table and Special Instruction 
We now describe how the compiler actually inserts protection operations to be 
executed by the hardware component at runtime. The central data structure involved is an 
action table. The action table records which action should be performed at a given 
program point on a given memory object. An example action table is shown as Table 8. 
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The action table is a hash table that uses an instruction’s PC address as its key. We 
always create a hash table without collisions to avoid the overhead of maintaining a spill 
list. Every table entry has three fields – action, memory object starting address, and 
memory object size. The action field has one bit – 1 denotes the action of changing the 
access permission from read-only to writable; 0 denotes the action of changing the access 
permission from writable to read-only.  
A special instruction is inserted at every protection point to inform the processor that 
at the given program point, some protection operation needs to be done. Whenever the 
processor encounters such a special instruction, it uses its PC address to index into the 
action table and to execute the desired action.  
Table 8. Action table 
 
Action Starting address End address 
0 Addr1 4
1 Addr2 8
0 Addr3 30
 …
 
Another possibility is to insert instructions to implement the intended protection 
operations directly instead of recording them in a separate action table. However, the 
action would require several instructions to implement, which indicates more changes to 
the processor’s standard ISA and more code space. Using a separate action table plus one 
special instruction appears to be a better solution to us. 
The action table requires the start address and the size of the modified memory 
object for every action. The important problem is that the information may not be 
available statically. In general, during compilation, we do not know the address of the 
local stack objects and the heap objects. For some heap objects, we may not even know 
their sizes. To solve this problem, the action table has to be made writable and the 
compiler has to insert instructions to fix the action table for stack and heap objects. Such 
modifications of the action table occur after every dynamic memory allocation and every 
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function entry point. The inserted code will update the action table with dynamically 
obtained address and size when necessary. 
4.5.2 Points-to Table 
Dealing with pointer dereferences is a difficult problem. Static compiler pointer 
analysis has a lot of limitations and in some cases cannot determine an accurate points-to 
set for a pointer dereference. If the points-to set of a pointer contains multiple possible 
memory objects, then before the pointer dereferencing store instruction, the access 
permission levels of all possible pointed-to memory objects have to be set to writable. 
Also, after the pointer dereferencing store instruction, the access permission levels of all 
possible pointed-to memory objects have to be set to read-only. This could increase the 
protection overhead significantly. Moreover, in some cases, the points-to set can be very 
big, even including all possible memory objects, which means the compiler cannot derive 
any useful points-to information for this dereference. If we choose not to handle such 
cases; then we have to give up protecting the dereferencing store instructions and a large 
number of locations would remain unprotected which sacrifices security. 
In our scheme, we use the pointer table developed in section 3.1. The inserted 
instructions are described in section 0. It is possible that a store instruction accesses 
multiple memory variables at different time. The dynamically maintained points-to 
information enables us to check store instructions regarding a program’s current 
execution state. Thus, we could handle instructions that access different objects.  
Not all information is available at compile time, and thus the tables have to be made 
writable, and the compiler has to insert instructions to fix the tables. However, making 
the table writable brings some security complications. Ideally, the tables should be put in 
the reserved address space, and made read-only to the user program, so that malicious 
corruptions could be avoided from the user program. Now, how to protect the tables 
becomes an issue. Our solution is to apply the protection mechanism in a hierarchical 
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way. That is, we use the same method to protect the tables residing in the memory. But in 
this case, the scale of the problem is much smaller, and the problem is much simpler. We 
know that the tables should only be modified by those fix-up instructions inserted by the 
compiler. We can regard one table as one single object and its address is predetermined. 
Thus, the additional checking table for protecting the original table can be easily 
constructed. It can be put in reserved address space, thus is not accessible to the user 
program, but only accessible to the hardware component. So it cannot be corrupted by the 
attacker. Then the original checking table can be protected properly. 
4.6 Architecture Support 
Figure 50 illustrates the necessary architecture support for our work. There are three 
major data structures. Action table and points-to table are hash tables as explained above. 
They are cached as data in data caches. The access bit table records the access permission 
level for every memory object. It is in a reserved space and can only be accessed by the 
hardware component of our protection scheme, thus is protected from tampering. Access 
bit table is large and accessed frequently. It has to be carefully managed to avoid 
significant space and performance overhead. A very similar problem exists in the 
Mondrian Memory Protection system work [76] and it provides an excellent reference on 
how to manage this large access permission table. We largely follow their design, 
regarding every memory object as a memory segment in their work. We deploy 
multi-level permission table with mini-SST entries that are elaborated in [76]. To 
improve performance, a protection lookaside buffer and sidecar registers are also 
deployed. Utilizing the design in [76] greatly reduces the space and performance 
overhead of our access bit table.  
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Figure 50. Architecture support overview. 
There are three kinds of operations performed by the hardware component. Upon 
fetching a protection instruction for a none pointer dereference store, the processor uses 
its PC address as the key to index the action table. Then the access bits for the memory 
object will be set according to the action, the starting address and the size. The access 
permission bits are set for protection instructions on pointer dereferenced memory objects 
based on the points-to table. Another case is when a store instruction is fetched. The 
processor checks the permission bits. If the instruction violates the access permission, 
then an alarm is raised indicating the program is under attack. 
4.7 Baseline against Attacks 
 In this section, we revisit the example attacks in section 4.2.5, and show how our 
scheme could detect all of these attacks successfully. In Figure 39, the buffer overflow 
attack takes place through the library function scanf. Although the second parameter 
passed to the function scanf is an array, in the function scanf, the data type of the second 
parameter is pointer. At the statement S1, the function scanf read the user input, and 
copies it to the buffer NewUser.username using a while-like statement. In the while-like 
statement, the pointer NewUser.username is increased by one in one iteration, and its 
Access bit table 
instruction CPU 
Action Table Protection instruction 
Set access bits 
Fetch 
Alarm 
Points-to table
Store instruction 
check access bit Protection instruction 
 
violation 
Set access bits
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points-to information is updated using the case “q = p + r”. The details of scanf could be 
found in the file scanf.c that is contained in the software utility library glib. The basic 
process is that the data is transferred from the I/O to a buffer by increasing a pointer (say 
str) that is pointing to the buffer. The essential part of our detection mechnism applied to 
this scenario is checking the store instruction (say store_inst) that defers the pointer str. 
We have the start address and the end address information to restrict the pointer 
dereference. When the instruction store_inst is going to be executed, the memory object 
is set to writable. The assertion checks the access bits and finds that store instruction is 
going to access memory out of bounds. Thus, the attack is detected.  
Similarly, we could catch the double free attack. In this example, when NewUser.dir 
is freed once, its begin and end addresses are invalid. Thus, the second free function call 
on it is claimed as illegal.  
The off-by-one bug could also be caught by our solution, since the write instruction 
exceeds the pointer’s access range. This proves that providing both fine level analysis and 
dynamic pointer tracking would offer a fine grained memory protection solution. 
4.8 Evaluation 
Table 9. Ref input set of benchmarks 
Applications Input set 
Bzip2 input.program 
Gzip nput.program 
Mcf inp.in 
Parser ref.in 
Adpcm(en) clinton.pcm 
Epic lana.tif 
G721(en) clinton.pcm 
Mesa None 
Mpeg(encoder) bitstream of YUV components 
Pegwit public_key,encryption_noise_file, plain_text 
 
Our experiments are based on x86 Pentium architecture. The compiler work was 
implemented using the MACH SUIF compiler. The benchmarks are from SPEC2000 
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integer benchmarks and MediaBench embedded benchmarks. The ref input sets for these 
benchmarks are shown in Table 9. 
4.8.1 Performance Measurement 
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Figure 51. Performance degradation. 
Figure 51 shows the performance degradation under our scheme. All hardware 
support modeling is done inside SimpleScalar targeted to x86. We did two set of 
experiments. Both of them include the optimizations described in sections 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 
and 4.4.6. The difference between the two sets of experiments is that the first experiment 
does not have dynamic pointer tracking that is our baseline; the second one enables 
dynamic pointer tracking with the possible optimizations. The Performance numbers are 
normalized to the original program binary without protection. From the results, the 
average performance degradation under the baseline protection scheme is 14%. The 
performance degradation mainly comes from the overhead to access the access bit table. 
Other sources of performance degradation include accessing the action table and the 
points-to table, update the points-to table, and executing the compiler inserted 
instructions to fix up the action table. The pointer table overhead is small except for the 
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parser benchmark, which makes intensive use of pointers throughout the whole program. 
The average performance degradation with dynamic pointer tracking is 15%. The less 
than 1% dynamic pointer tracking overhead is tolerable if we could achieve big security 
improvement as shown in section 4.8.2. 
4.8.2 Security Measurement 
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Figure 52. Security measurement 
 
Figure 52 shows the security measurement. Under our baseline protection scheme, 
the access permission level for a memory object is set to writable just before a store 
instruction writing to it and set to read-only right after the store. Therefore the baseline 
protection scheme can detect all memory corruption attacks exploiting the flaws in the 
program such as the buffer overflows and double free vulnerabilities, since an attack 
needs a store instruction to do the tampering and that attacking store instruction has to be 
between the pair of “set to writable” and “set to read-only” operations. This corresponds 
to the 100% protection shown in Figure 52. Due to the motion and removal of protection 
points caused by compiler optimizations, some memory locations could be left 
unprotected. The reason is that another store instruction str2 may be between the “set to 
101 
writable” operation and the “set to read-only” operation for str1 now, and str2 could be 
the attacking store instruction and could possibly tamper the memory object to be written 
by str1. Also, if a pointer points to an unexpected memory object at runtime, the write 
will not be checked against the access permission table, thus there could be false 
negatives too. We count the number of dynamic store instructions like str2, then 
subtracted those from the total dynamic store instructions to measure the protection 
strength. As per this calculation, a higher number of dynamic store instructions after 
subtraction means the higher the protection strength is. The results in Figure 52 indicate 
that the compiler optimizations do not lead to much security degradation. With dynamic 
pointer tracking, the average security strength is 92%, which is 7% higher than without 
dynamic pointer tracking, and 3% higher than the estimated most likely accessed object 
approach. This is due to the fact that in most of programs, there are much more pointer 
dereference stores than pointer assignments. In the benchmarks, many pointers are used 
to access buffers. The auto increment update removal optimization eliminates all updates 
for such pointers, and save enormous cycles. Even with the optimized dynamic pointer 
tracking, the security could be maintained at the same level. Those schemes to improve 
the performance like protection point hoisting, grouping, and removal are not viable since 
we can not scarify security for performance, and that is why we thought of dynamic 
pointer tracking and its optimizations. With the points-to sets, we get security 
enhancement (and no degradation), and we are able to tackle the overheads as well.  
It should be noted that the above method to measure protection strength represents 
the worst case. The above method assumes that every store instruction moved into a pair 
of “set to writable” and “set to read only” operations could be an attacking instruction or 
an attacking point. In reality, normally a program only has a few possible attacking 
instructions. For example, for a buffer overflow attack exploiting the strcpy function, the 
store instruction in the strcpy function implementation is the possible attacking 
instruction. As long as our optimizations do not move that possible attacking instruction 
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into a pair of “set to writable” and “set to read only” operations (which is very unlikely), 
the security will not be harmed. Thus, our scheme has a much stronger detection strength 
against real-world attacks than represented by the above worst case. 
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Figure 53. Detected simulated attacks. 
We further performed simulated attacks to our benchmarks. We run the benchmarks 
in the simulator and then randomly tamper a memory location by making a store 
instruction write to a different memory location to see whether our scheme is able to 
detect the tampering. For each benchmark, we perform such simulated attacks by 
tampering at 1000 different memory locations. In our experiments, we assume that every 
store instruction could be an attacking instruction, so again our results represent the worst 
case since the possible attacking instructions in a program are very limited as discussed 
above. Figure 53 shows the percentage of attacks detected. On average, 8% more 
randomly injected memory tamperings are detected with dynamic pointer tracking than 
without dynamic pointer tracking, 4% more attacks are detected with dynamic pointer 
tracking than with most likely accessed object estimation. It shows that our scheme with 
a dynamic pointer tracker’s help is very effective to protect memory tampering attacks.   
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Attacks including the access control and non-control data attacks against a number 
of real-world network applications are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
technique in the following discussion. We test real-world attacks against network 
applications running on SimpleScalar augmented with our protection scheme. Briefly, we 
evaluate our work focusing on five types of attacks as shown below. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 54. Buffer overflow in Wu-FTP. 
 
Buffer overflow against static data. The Wu-FTP server is a popular FTP server. 
The buffer overflow vulnerability in the function do_elem is a breach in Wu-FTP [45] 
allowing attackers overwrite memory locations as shown in Figure 54. We designed a 
long string as the path name representing the series of directories to exploit this 
vulnerability. In the initialization of the FTP server, the path name (that comes from the 
user input) is passed to the function do_elem. In this function, the object mapped_path is 
int mapping_chdir(char *orig_path){ 
int ret; 
  char *sl, *path; 
  path = &pathspace[0]; 
  strcpy(path, orig_path); 
//path = abcdefgh 
  while ((sl = strchr(path, '/'))) { 
char *dir; 
dir = path; 
if (*dir) 
do_elem(dir); 
    } 
} 
Void do_elem(char * dir) { 
… 
If(!(mapped_path[0] == ‘/’ &&  mapped_path[1] == ‘0’)) 
 strcat(mapped_path, “/”); 
 strcat(mapped_path, dir); 
} 
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overflowed at the statement strcat(mapped_path, dir), since the object pointed by the 
pointer dir is larger than the size of mapped_path.  
Buffer overflow against stack data. In the file ftpd.c in Wu-FTP, there are buffer 
overflow vulnerabilities in the function skey_challenge, which potentially can be 
exploited by malicious users to compromise the whole system. The variable *name is 
never subject to any boundary checking. It is possible to write beyond the buf[] array, 
overwriting the return address of the function, modifying the path of execution flow 
through the second sprintf function.  
Off-by-one. The off-by-one problem discovered in Wu-FTP [83] was tested against 
out technique. This bug could be easily detected by our system through the access range 
checking. 
Double free. The double-free bug in MIT Kerberos [82] was detected by our 
technique successfully since the first free function call set the pointer to null, and the 
second free function call is checked against null parameter. 
4.8.3 Space Cost Measurement 
Table 10. Space cost measurement. 
Benchmark 
Action table 
size 
(byte) 
Access bit 
table size 
(KB) 
Points-to table 
size 
(byte) 
Code size 
increase 
 (byte) 
Bzip2 14016 147 472 7018
Gzip 13216 159 496 11520
Mcf 21248 306 338 29477
Parser 62272 323 1222 45138
Adpcm_en 672 24 30 349
Epic 10784 160 222 5395
G721_en 3200 59 100 1610
Mpeg_en 24864 89 318 12436
Mesa 770976 79 106 385488
Pegwit 40096 77 248 20057
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The space cost is shown in Table 10. There are four fields in this table. The first 
three fields represent the sizes of the action table, the access bit table, and the points-to 
table. The last field shows the total code size increase of the program due the insertion of 
protection operations. The additional action table to protect the original action table only 
requires a little space, so we do not show its size here. We use a multi-level permission 
table. The average sizes of the action table, the access bit table, the points-to table, and 
the code increase are 96134 bytes, 142 KB, 355 bytes and 51848 bytes respectively. 
Some of the access bit table sizes are small, such as the adpcm encoder (adpcm_en) and 
g721 encoder (g721_en). This is because these applications have only a few objects and 
these objects are big in size. The access permissions for one object are compacted using 
the Mini-SST technique, which could save a lot of space. The average size of points-to 
set for each pointer dereferencing store instruction is 1.58. The results show that the 
space cost of our protection technique is at most several hundred kilo bytes, which is very 
acceptable for modern computers. 
4.9 Summary 
Memory protection at fine level against non control flow data attacks is important, 
but so far there has not been a solution that offers full protection. Since the pointers 
important practical languages such as C/C++ allow them to visit any memory location, 
lack of such a solution leaves the software written in these languages vulnerable. In this 
work, we tackle the problem of detecting memory attacks with dynamic pointer tracking. 
We propose a compiler baseline framework that refines the points-to set dynamically to 
detect memory access violations. Architectural support is designed to optimize the 
scheme and to reduce the runtime overhead. On modern processors, the additional space 
overheads due to the protection tables are negligible allowing the performance 
degradation to be within limits. The other overheads (due to the checking and updating 
operations) could be minimized through a careful data-structure consideration coupled 
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with clever placement of operations. Thus, the work shows that on modern processors, it 
is possible to achieve memory protection at fine level by using a combination of dynamic 
pointer tracking at a reasonable performance penalty.  
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CHAPTER 5  
GARBAGE COLLECTION WITH DYNAMIC POINTER 
TRACKING 
5.1 Introduction  
Garbage collection is the process of detecting useless objects in memory, and 
reclaiming the resources allocated for these useless objects. It is used to help programs 
become more stable, to detect memory leaks, to identify program bugs, and to improve 
the performance. Garbage collection has been studied for a long time, and many 
programming languages, like Java, C#, Modular-3, and C++, tend to support garbage 
collection in some environments. Garbage collector is usually implemented with the 
compiler, the memory allocator, and the runtime system support. 
5.2 Traditional Garbage Collection Techniques 
There are two major garbage collection techniques. We compare them in the 
following. 
5.2.1 Reference Counting Collectors 
Reference counting is a kind of garbage collection technique. It counts the number 
of references to an object. When a reference to an object is created, its reference count is 
increased, and when the reference is gone, the reference count is reduced. An object is 
declared as garbage if its reference count is zero.  
The advantages of reference counting collectors are obvious. First, the garbage 
objects could be reclaimed immediately after they become garbage. Thus, the program is 
not paused for a long time, which is desired in real-time systems for live services. 
Second, it could be applied to both user programs and operating systems to detect 
memory leaks. Third, it requires simple implementation. 
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Reference counting collector has two disadvantages. First, it cannot deal with 
reference cycles very well. A naïve reference counting collector can not reclaim cyclic 
data structures since every object in a cyclic data structure has at least one reference 
count. Second, the runtime overhead is huge if the reference count is updated frequently. 
A large number of pointer copies and an inefficient reference counting algorithm could 
significantely degrade the performance. Third, the space cost is a concern for big 
applications. In reference counting collector, every object in memory has a tag indicating 
the number of reference to it. The reserved space could influence the cache performance 
and memory usage if the number of objects is big.   
Reference counting was first invented by Collins [18]. Improvements on the original 
reference counting technique were proposed in the literature [54][16][7][8][10][55] 
[25][4][75][39][54]. Baker [7] studied garbage collection and discovered that most of 
references come from local variables that have short life time. Deferring the update for 
these references to necessary positions would eliminate a number of overheads. It is 
critical to keep the reference counts in a consistent state by deferring the update. 
Levanoni and Petrank [46] developed a framework aiming at multi-processor systems. 
They removed the barrier of operation synchronization by providing a snapshot of the 
heap.  
5.2.2 Tracing Collectors 
Tracing garbage collector is another kind of garbage collector. It relies on object 
reachability analysis. First, a tracing garbage collector identifies root objects, which are 
usually the global objects, and the objects on the call stack and registers. Then, the 
collector starts from the root objects and get a transitive closure of all live objects. 
Finally, the objects that are not reachable from the root objects are determined to be 
garbage.  
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The basic algorithm is called mark-and-sweep, which performs garbage collection 
after a certain period or when the system is running out of memory. Every object in 
memory has a tag indicating if it is being used or not. Between two garbage collections, 
the tag is cleared. Note that the tag is usually one bit that is smaller than the reference 
count used in the reference counting collector. In garbage collection, the program or the 
system is suspended. Then, it sweeps the root objects, and set their flags. Next, the 
algorithm continues mark objects reachable from the root objects. Finally, it scans the 
memory again to reclaim the space occupied by the objects that are not flagged. Thus, it 
requires several memory scans.  
The advantage of tracing collectors is that it is more efficient compared with 
reference counting collectors since there is not runtime update. But they have two main 
problems. First, the program has to be paused during garbage collection, which is not 
tolerable for some programs and systems, though it could be improved by only collecting 
newly created objects[56]. Second, it requires at least one flag for one object.  
5.2.3 Challenges of Garbage Collection for C and C++ 
One big problem in implementing the mark sweep collector for programs written in 
programming languages like C and C++ is how to locate the root pointers. Unlike Java, C 
and C++ allow a programmer to define and manipulate pointers freely. The compiler 
could identify pointers easily based on the type information. However, at runtime without 
the type knowledge, a conservative way has to be developed to tell if the data in memory 
is a pointer or not. The state of art garbage collectors for C and C++ could not solve the 
problem completely. Most of the approaches either make some assumptions regarding the 
representation of pointers or generate some rules to locate pointers. 
A Boehm-Demers-Weiser garbage collector [84] was proposed by HP lab. They 
implemented a mark-sweep style collector as a library. They determine whether the data 
is actually the address of a heap object by three filtering passes. First, the candidate 
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pointer is checked against the heap bounds. Then, the candidate pointer value is used to 
identify the page where it exists and its offset within that page. The page address is 
looked in a table to return either an object descriptor or a value indicating that if it is not 
an actual pointer. Next, the object descriptor is used to locate the object in memory. Their 
approach is based on the assumption that the data whose value falls in the range of 
collectable objects should be a pointer. However, the data could happen to be the value 
within the range while it is not actually a pointer. 
5.2.4 Our Contribution 
Garbage collection seems very promising to future programs developed in C/C++. 
With the wide spread of the 64-bit architectures and the fast growth in use of very large 
heaps, especially for game development, the traditional reference counting and tracing 
algorithms developed for type safe languages like Java are not sufficient to develop 
efficient garbage collectors. Dynamic pointer tracking provides a novel solution in 
garbage collection. It is not necessary to scan the whole memory searching for live heap 
objects as previous work does. The points-to information in the pointer table could help 
us exact the live objects. With further optimizations, the dynamic pointer tracking 
technique could be polished ameliorated for garbage collection.  
Our approach has several obvious advantages over both reference counting and 
mark sweep garbage collectors. Compared with reference counting garbage collectors, 
(1) We could deal with cyclic data structure since we use the global/static pointers 
and pointers on the stack as the root to get a transitive closure of live objects. 
(2) Our runtime overhead is less than reference counting. In our baseline, for one 
pointer assignment, we have two operations (update the pointer’s points-to 
object start and end addresses). In reference counting, one pointer assignment 
(i.e. the pointer is switched from an old object to a new object) results in more 
than four operations (decrease the old object’s counter, increase the new 
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object counter, and checks if the old object’s counter is zero; if so, the object 
is deleted), which includes one conditional jump. 
Compared with traditional tracing collectors, 
(1) We have less pause time since not all memory need to be scanned. 
(2) We identify pointers through the pointer declaration, not by the garbage 
collector based on some manually defined rules. 
(3) Our dynamic pointer tracking solution is compatible with previous tracing 
collectors. 
5.3 Garbage Collection Algorithms 
Our garbage collection is divided to two steps. First, the user selects places in the 
program where to mark garbage objects. Another choice is to enable the mark process 
when new objects are created. Second, the system notifies the collector when the system 
has idle time for reclaiming the garbage memory. In this section, we only focus on the 
marking step in mark-sweep style collectors. We introduce three garbage collection 
algorithms using the customized dynamic pointer tracking scheme. 
5.3.1 Maintaining Object Table 
The straightforward way to do garbage collection is that for every object, maintain 
the whole transitive closure of pointers pointing to it. In this case, the reachability 
information is important. One naïve solution is that the full reachability information is 
stored in an object table. One table entry corresponds to one object including the pointers 
pointing to the object and the pointers contained in the object. If there does not exist any 
pointer pointing to the object, it is determined to be garbage. 
Figure 55 shows one example object table. The table is indexed with an object id. 
Every object has a unique object id. One entry contains two fields, in pointer and out 
pointer, both of which are represented using linked lists. The in pointer list contains the 
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pointers that are reachable to the object; the out pointer list contains the pointers that exist 
in the object. We have two methods to update the in pointer list. The first one lives 
without the pointer table. For a pointer assignment p = q, it scans all in pointer lists 
looking for the pointers p and q. Then it removes p from the in pointer list, and appends it 
to the in pointer list that contains q. This design is awkward and slow. The second 
algorithm seeks help from the pointer table. The pointer table remembers the pointer’s 
target object. When a pointer is assigned, the pointer table is looked up to get the 
pointer’s target object in the object table, then the pointer is removed from the old 
object’s in pointer list and inserted in the new object’s in pointer list. Using two tables 
could speed up the updating process. The out pointer list could be generated statically by 
the compiler for global and local variables. The pointers in dynamically allocated object 
could be obtained after the object is created.  
 
Figure 55. Example object table. 
The out pointer list is used to aggressively collect garbage objects. Consider the 
example shown in Figure 56, when the function foo returns, the pointer head, curr_node, 
and prev_node are destroyed, and their points-to information are invalid. The data 
relationship is shown in Figure 57. The deadness of the pointer head results in the 
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deadness of the object O1. Claiming the object O1 as garbage voids the pointer in it. 
Thus, the other objects in the chain could be recycled recursively.  
 
Figure 56. Cyclic data structure example code. 
 
Figure 57. Cyclic data structure graphic view. 
This design could be considered as another form of reference counting. The 
advantage of this scheme is that the garbage object could be detected instantly and the 
memory location it occupies could be reclaimed immediately. The disadvantages include 
the tremendous overheads and the disability to handle circles. In the example shown in 
Figure 57, suppose that there is an arrow from the object O6 to the object O1. Even if the 
program exits in the function foo, and the references through the pointers head, 
curr_node, and prev_node are removed, the cyclic data structure remains live. 
5.3.2 Maintaining Pointer Table 
foo () { 
 Node * head, * prev_node, * curr_node; 
 head = (Node*)malloc(sizeof(Node)); 
 prev_node = head; 
 for(i = 0; i < 5; i++) { 
  curr_node = (Node*)malloc(sizeof(Node)); 
  prev_node.next = curr_node; 
  prev_node = curr_node;  
 } 
} 
O1 O2 O3
O6 O5
head
O4
curr node prev node
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The second algorithm is using the pointer table to determine if an object is live or 
not. The pointers are classified in two categories – class one contains pointers on the 
heap; class two includes the other pointers like global pointers, static pointers and 
pointers on the stack. The pointer table could be used in mark-sweep style garbage 
collectors. At the collection cycle, the pointer table is scanned starting from the pointers 
of class one (root pointers). Then, using the referent pointer information in the pointer 
table, other pointers that are reachable to the root pointers are identified. The union of the 
pointers access ranges is the live memory locations; other allocated memory space could 
be recycled.  
The advantage of this approach is that the pointers are located at compile time. It 
removes the barrier of locating pointers and object bounds using some manually 
determined rules. Through smart insertion of the updating code, we could update the 
points-to sets efficiently.  
 
Figure 58. Garbage collection with pointer casting. 
Pointer casting caused problems in garbage collection as shown in Figure 58. A 
pointer pa is declared with the base type A, but it is cast and points to an object of type B. 
In this case, to achieve garbage collection safety, the dynamic pointer tracking algorithm 
assumes that the object pointed by pa is of the type B. In other words, down casting 
enlarges the data pointed by a pointer.  
struct A { 
  int a; 
} A; 
struct B { 
  int a; 
  int b; 
} 
Foo(){ 
  A * pa; 
  B * pb; 
  pb = (B*) malloc(sizeof(struct B)); 
  pa = (B*) pb; 
} 
 
 
a 
 
 
 
 
b
pa 
pb 
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5.3.3 Maintaining Pointer Address 
The last algorithm co-operates with the garbage collector from HP labs. The main 
idea is to collect the root pointers in a program. To identify where a pointer is, we design 
a table only remembering the address of pointers. The pointer table is still indexed by a 
pointer id. The statically and dynamically declared pointers are managed in a similar way 
as shown, before except that a pointer table entry contains a pointer’s address, not the 
pointer’s target.  
The advantage of this algorithm is that the runtime overhead of tracking the pointer 
location is very little. At the places where a pointer is created/destroyed (usually through 
malloc-like and free-like functions), the pointer table is updated. The little overhead 
could improve the garbage collector significantly. First, the root pointer information is 
available in the pointer table, thus the step of scanning the whole stack and the registers is 
bypassed, which speeds up the marking process. Second, recording the root pointers in 
the pointer table is more accurate and safer than using some rules or based on the pointers 
value.  
This garbage collector is conservative to achieve memory safety. We consider the 
pointers in the pointer table as the candidates to do garbage collection. Other pointers that 
are not tracked, we assume that the objects pointed by them are live. In other words, only 
the objects that are pointed by the dead pointers in the pointer table are collected. This is 
a conservative way to achieve safety. The specification of dynamic pointer tracking 
safety is a promise to program analyzer and optimizer. If all program’s actions are legal, 
then dynamic pointer tracking will remain transparent to the program. Dynamic pointer 
tracking is transparent if it does not change the program semantics, and it does not make 
invalid change to the program data. Coexistent problem could result in undetected dead 
objects pointed by untracked pointers. 
5.4 Heap Shape Analysis Results 
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Figure 59. Heap object size. 
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Figure 60. Number of heap objects. 
Figure 59 to Figure 61 reports the heap shape analysis results. The heap objects are 
the user declared heap objects. Most of the heap objects are live throughout the whole 
program. It is not hard to have following observations: 
(1) The heap object size increases steadily as the program executes as shown in 
Figure 59. The bh program gets to it peek heap object size at the early stage of the 
program. The health and union programs almost linearly creates heap objects as it 
executes. The voronoi benchmark creates a small number of heap objects, which 
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is not noticeable in the chart. The other benchmarks stop allocating space for heap 
objects in the middle of their execution. 
(2) These applications have a big number of heap objects as shown in Figure 60, 
ranging from 59 to 21216. 
(3) The average heap object size is almost constant per application (except voronoi) 
as shown in Figure 61. This is due to the fact that most of those applications 
create heap objects of the same type. The heap object size is relatively small. 
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Figure 61. Average heap object size. 
5.5 Garbage Collection Results 
There are not good garbage collection benchmarks in C. The only one we find is the 
artificial benchmark from HP Lab [85]. It builds binary trees by allocating a numerous 
heap objects, and set the tree root to null, that results in all nodes in the tree being dead. 
The number of heap objects grows linearly with the program’s execution time. This is a 
good study case to test the ability of garbage collectors.  
We implemented two algorithms described in section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. The garbage 
collector though maintaining the object table as shown in section 5.3.1 involves 
enormous performance degradation (more than 3X) on the artificial garbage collection 
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application, so it is not the focus of this section. The number of dynamically executed 
instructions is increased by 35% and 5%. The space cost of the garbage collector by 
maintaining the pointer table is dominated by the pointer table size. Every entry has eight 
bytes storing the start and end addresses. The program does not have pointer chasing, so 
the third entry is not necessary. The original program without garbage collection or user 
written free function calls consumes 490.7M bytes heap space. The pointer table size is 
13.6M bytes and 6.8M bytes, that is 2.8% and 1.4% of the heap space occupied by the 
program. The other optimizations except update propagation are not applied to the 
benchmark since the conditions are not satisfied. This application is selected only to see 
the feasibility of our garbage collection, not the performance aspect. Note this is an 
extreme case, in most of applications like the spec200 benchmarks, only a few pointers 
are deployed, thus the pointer table size is relative small. Figure 62 shows the number of 
garbage objects detected by both of the garbage collectors. We could detect all garbage 
objects in the artificial garbage collection benchmark.  
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Figure 62. Garbage objects detection result. 
5.6 Summary 
In this work, we propose several garbage collection algorithms based on dynamic 
pointer tracking. This demonstrates the feasibility of applying dynamic pointer tracking 
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in real world applications. It also shows that the pointer information at different levels 
could be crafted and customized according to different requirements. It proves the 
flexibility and portability of our tracker.  
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CHAPTER 6  
DYNAMIC INVARIANT PREDICATE IDENTIFICATION WITH 
DYNAMIC POINTER TRACKING 
In this section, we present our work regarding dynamic invariant identification. In 
particular, we propose a framework that aims at identifying more invariant variables 
based on the runtime information, and thus recognizing more invariant predicates. 
Significant opportunities exist at runtime to identify invariants that static analysis is 
unable to tackle. To achieve the goal, we perform two types of analysis – Static and 
Dynamic. Each of the analysis is explained below. 
6.1 Static Analysis  
The goal of static analysis is to identify potential candidates for dynamic analysis. 
This is done to reduce the dynamic analysis overhead. Specifically, for each loop, we first 
analyze the predicates (branch conditions) present in them. The outcome of this analysis 
is used to classify the predicates into two groups: Invariant and Maybe Invariant. 
A predicate is classified as invariant if all of its operands do not have loop carried 
definitions. In other words, all definitions of the variables used in a predicate are 
generated outside the loop, which include those definitions through pointer dereferences. 
If there exists at least one path inside the loop; along the path all of a predicate’s 
operands are not defined, then the predicate is said to be maybe invariant. In this case, all 
predicate operand definitions are guarded by invariant predicates. The main idea of this 
classification is to expose a secondary effect of the invariant predicate evaluation. In case 
paths holding definitions of the maybe predicate operands become dead, the maybe 
invariant predicate might become dynamically invariant and further opportunities for 
removing dead paths are exposed. We call this as the secondary effect. The classification 
of predicates is performed by analyzing reacheable definitions of each variable involved 
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in a predicate. Then for each maybe invariant predicate, we store the predicate operands 
definitions along with the corresponding basic blocks where they are defined.  
At the end of the static analysis, we have a list of invariant and maybe invariant 
predicates. For each invariant and maybe invariant predicate, we generate the code in the 
loop pre-header evaluating each predicate. The code generated, would be executed at 
runtime and a dynamic analysis would be performed based on the predicate evaluation.  
6.2 Dynamic Analysis 
In the dynamic analysis, we first perform the standard constant propagation based on 
the parameter value (note that many function parameters are input only value and serve as 
dynamic constants in an execution instance of the function). Then the interface function 
is invoked at runtime. Next the interface function, present at the loop pre-header is 
evaluated as in Figure 63. The invariant predicates are evaluated to identify dead 
branches. Then we check if a maybe invariant predicate becomes an invariant one. This is 
accomplished by executing the algorithm given in Figure 64, Figure 65 and Figure 66. 
In maybe invariant checking, we first evaluate branch conditions. Based on the 
evaluation results, all edges along which the execution cannot proceed are collected as 
NotTakenPaths. If the block B has zero predecessors, then it is marked as not executed 
block. We repeat the above process on B's successors. This iterative procedure is 
accomplished using a stack. _push() and _pop() are the corresponding functions used for 
storing and retrieving the basic blocks that need to be processed.  
Such recognition of dead paths may in turn lead to other predicates becoming 
invariant, which is called the secondary effect. This might happen when the definition 
blocks of predicate operands are in fact on dead paths. In order to take advantage of the 
secondary effect, we keep a list of maybe invariant predicates along with the set Def(p), 
that contains definition blocks of operands in a predicate p within a loop. All marked 
blocks are removed from the Def(p) set. If this removal leads to Def(p) becoming an 
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empty set, then the maybe invariant predicate p becomes an invariant one and is added to 
the invariant predicate list. The analysis terminates when there is no invariant predicate to 
be processed anymore. Finally the invariant predicate list contains all invariant branch 
conditions.  
 
Figure 63. Dynamic invariant predicate identification algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 64. Process invariant predicate list. 
function: ProcInvarList() 
Input: CFG, InvarList, S(Stack) 
 CFG is the control flow graph of a given function 
  InvarList is the list of invariant predicates 
  S is the stack for blocks to be processed 
Output: Basic blocks in CFG marked as dead 
 
For i in InvarList do 
  NotTakenPaths = _eval(i) 
  For e(Bp;B) in NotTakenPaths 
   _push(B, S) 
  EndFor 
  ProcBBStack() 
EndFor 
function: DynamicInvarIdentification() 
Input: InvarList, MaybeInvarList 
     InvarList is the list of invariant predicates 
     MaybeInvarList is the list of maybe invariant predicates  
Output: List of dynamic invariant predicates 
 
ProcInvarList() 
While(InvarList) 
  ProcMaybeInvarList() 
EndWhile 
123 
 
Figure 65. Process maybe invariant predicate list. 
 
 
Figure 66. Process stack of basic blocks marked as dead. 
6.3 Illustration  
function: ProcBBstack() 
Input: CFG, S(Stack) 
 CFG is the control flow graph of a given function 
 S is the stack of blocks to be processed for removal 
Output: Basic locks marked as dead 
 
While ((B = pop(S)) != NULL ) 
  If ( num_pred(B) = 0) 
    _mark(B) 
For Bs in succ(B) 
  If(!_marked(Bs)) 
        _push(Bs, S) 
      EndIf 
    EndFor 
  EndIf 
EndWhile 
function: ProcMaybeInvarList() 
Input: CFG, InvarList, MaybeInvarList, Def(P) 
 CFG is the control flow graph of a given function 
     InvarList is the list of invariant predicates 
 MaybeInvarList is the list of maybe invariant predicates 
 Def(P) is the set of definition blocks of operands  
     in each maybe invariant predicate P 
Output: Modified InvarList 
 
For i in MaybeInvarList 
  For B in Def(i) 
    If (_marked(B)) 
      _remove_def_block(B, Def(i)) 
    EndIf 
  EndFor 
  If (Def(i) is NULL) 
    add_to_invarlist(i) 
  EndIf 
EndFor 
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We now illustrate our dynamic invariant predicate identification algorithm with the 
help of an example. Figure 67 gives a motivation example that is a typical control flow 
graph of a loop with branch conditions in it. The static analysis on this example 
determines that the predicate a > b is invariant. The branch condition *p < 5 is classified 
as a maybe invariant. Statically, the set Def(*p < 5) includes the definitions of *p in the 
basic blocks B5 and B12. The other predicates d < e and f > lim are not classified under 
either of the predicate lists. This is so because their operand definitions are loop 
generated on all branches (B6, B7, B8, and B9). 
 
Figure 67. Example showing predicates inside a loop. 
 
At the end of the static analysis, an Interface Function is constructed at the 
pre-header of the loop. This function performs the dynamic analysis using invariant and 
maybe invariant lists. The invariant predicate a > b is evaluated by the Interface Function 
based on the runtime value of a and b. If a > b evaluates to the path P1 as shown in Figure 
P2 
a > b
*p < 5
f = f1() 
f>lim **q = x
*p = … 
d = … d = f3()
d < e 
f = f2()
 
exit node 
B2 
P1 
INTERFACE 
B1
B4 B5
B8 B9
B11 
B3
B6 B7 
B10
B12
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68, then the path P2 becomes dead. The algorithm achieves this by first removing the 
edge <B1, B3>. Since the number of predecessors of B3 is zero, B3 can now be marked 
dead. Continuing with B3, the edges <B3, B6> and <B3, B7> are removed. Now Both B6 
and B7 have zero predecessors, and hence they are marked dead. The algorithm proceeds 
by marking blocks B10 and B12 as dead except for the exit node as it still has a 
predecessor other than B12. After all of the invariant predicates are processed, the 
algorithm proceeds to handle the maybe invariant predicate *p < 5. Statically, the pointer 
q could chase p. However, assume in the current context, p is not chasing p, so the 
definition in B5 will not modify the value of *p, and the set Def(*p < 5) has only one 
definition block B12. B12 is dead, so it is removed from the Def(*p < 5) set leaving it 
empty. As a result, the predicate *p < 5 becomes invariant, and it is added to the invariant 
predicate list. 
 
Figure 68. Control flow graph when the path P1 is taken. 
 
a > b
*p < 5
f = f1()
f>lim **q=x
f = f2()
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Figure 69. Control flow graph when the paths P1 and P3 are taken. 
 
 
 
Figure 70. Control flow graph when the paths P1 and P4 are taken. 
 
Figure 71. Control flow graph when the path P2 is taken. 
d < e 
d = f3() d = … 
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B3 
B6 B7 
B10 
B12 
f = f2()f = f1() 
f>lim B4 
B8 B9 
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B9 
B11 
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It proceeds similarly for *p < 5 by first evaluating it. If the evaluation leads to the 
path P3, then the block B5 will be marked dead. The resulting control flow graph in this 
case is shown in Figure 69. Alternately, if *p < 5 evaluates to the path P4, then the blocks 
B4 and B8 would be marked dead. The final control flow graph would appear as shown 
in Figure 70. If the predicate a > b gets evaluated to the path P2, then the blocks under the 
path P1 become dead applying the above algorithm. Hence, the final resulting control 
flow graph is given by Figure 71.  
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we propose a dynamic invariant predicate identification method. 
Dynamic invariant predicate identification could detect more invariants than the static 
analysis. It is useful in program understanding and other applications. For example, it 
could help eliminate more dead code during program migration in mobile computing. It 
could assist runtime program properties verification, which often relies on an invariant 
assert statement in formal specifications. In this work, we combine the static analysis and 
the runtime context to determine the dead branches and basic blocks. The algorithm starts 
with the invariant predictions identified statically, and then proceeds to propagate the 
deadness information to other basic blocks until it gets a transitive closure of dead blocks. 
The maybe invariant predicate becomes invariant if all of the predicate definitions are in 
the dead basic blocks. With dynamic pointer tracking, the memory ambiguity is clarified, 
and thus explores more opportunities for dynamic invariant predicate identification. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we propose and evaluate a dynamic pointer tracking framework to 
assist and enable program analysis, understanding, and optimization. This thesis 
represents two example applications as the dynamic pointer tracking consumers with 
different design and implementation goals: 
Memory protection: a security-oriented approach that prevents erroneous memory 
stores from corrupting the sensitive program data. This approach can be integrated with 
enhanced secure architecture design for lowering the overheads.  
Garbage collection: an approach that targets weakly typed programming languages 
such as C. The innovation of this approach is that our work enables a hybrid garbage 
collector. This garbage collector has both of the advantages of the reference counting 
style and mark sweep style garbage collectors. The dynamic unreachable code detection 
enables our garbage collector with more useful information, and thus improves the 
collection strength. 
Dynamic invariant predicate identification: a method that dynamically identifies 
invariant predicate is proposed in this thesis. The static invariant identification is not 
good enough to catch all invariants at runtime. A framework based on the current context 
is necessary to aggressively find all possible invariant predicate. The branch conditions 
are evaluated, and the unreachable branches and basic blocks are marked as dead in the 
control flow graph. The new dead basic blocks could remove some definitions of the 
variables that are used by other branch condition. More variables become invariant, and 
more branch conditions could be predicted. The contribution of the proposed algorithm 
could detect both of the runtime dead basic blocks and functions. 
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Our work is still preliminary. The dynamic pointer tracking is practical to be 
customized and further optimized for other research topic. The effectiveness our 
approach at monitoring the program pointers behavior suggests a direction for future 
research work on understanding other program properties with dynamic tracking.  
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